

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST**

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR
ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST PUBLISHING
INC./PUBLICATIONS CANWEST INC., CANWEST BOOKS
INC., AND CANWEST (CANADA) INC.

APPLICANTS

**BOOK OF AUTHORITIES
(Motion for Sanction of the Amended AHC Plan)**

June 16, 2010

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TAB 1

Case Name:

**ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative
Investments II Corp.**

**IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended**

**AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise and
Arrangement involving Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative
Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative
Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative
Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative
Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative
Investments XII Corp., 6932819 Canada Inc. and 4446372
Canada Inc., Trustees of the Conduits Listed In
Schedule "A" Hereto**

Between

**The Investors represented on the Pan-Canadian Investors
Committee for Third-Party Structured Asset-Backed
Commercial Paper listed in Schedule "B" hereto,
Applicants, and**

**Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.,
Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp.,
Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp.,
Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp.,
Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp.,
6932819 Canada Inc. and 4446372 Canada Inc., Trustees
of the Conduits listed in Schedule "A" hereto,
Respondents**

[2008] O.J. No. 2265

43 C.B.R. (5th) 269

2008 CarswellOnt 3523

168 A.C.W.S. (3d) 244

47 B.L.R. (4th) 74

2008 CanLII 27820

Court File No. 08-CL-7440

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

C.L. Campbell J.

Heard: May 12-13 and June 3, 2008.

Judgment: June 5, 2008.

(158 paras.)

Insolvency law -- Proposals -- Court approval -- Effect of proposal -- Voting by creditors -- Application by the investors represented by the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee for approval of a Plan under the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act as filed and voted on by noteholders -- Plan was opposed by a number of corporate and individual noteholders on the basis that the court did not have jurisdiction under the CCAA or, if it did, should decline to exercise discretion to approve third party releases -- Application allowed -- Releases sought as part of the plan, including the language exempting fraud, were permissible under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and were fair and reasonable -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

Application by the investors represented by the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee for third-party structured asset-backed commercial paper for approval of a plan under the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act as filed and voted on by noteholders. Plan was opposed by a number of corporate and individual noteholders, primarily on the basis that the court did not have jurisdiction under the CCAA or, if it did, should decline to exercise discretion to approve third party releases. Between mid-2007 and the filing of the plan, the applicant Committee had diligently pursued the object of restructuring not just the specific trusts that were part of the plan, but faith in a market structure that had been a significant part of the Canadian financial market. Claims for damages included the face value of notes plus interest and additional penalties and damages that might be allowable at law. Information provided by the potential defendants indicated the likelihood of claims over and against parties such that no entity, institution or party involved in the restructuring plan could be assured being spared from likely involvement in lawsuits by way of third party or other claims over.

HELD: The releases sought as part of the plan, including the language exempting fraud, were permissible under the CCAA and were fair and reasonable. The motion to approve the plan of arrangement sought by the application was allowed on the terms of the draft order. The plan was a business proposal and that included the releases. The plan had received overwhelming creditor support. The situation in this case was a unique one in which it was necessary to look at larger issues than those affecting those who felt strongly that personal redress should predominate.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Counsel:

B. Zarnett, F. Myers, B. Empey for the Applicants.

For parties and their counsel see Appendix 1.

REASONS FOR DECISION

1 C.L. CAMPBELL J.:-- This decision follows a sanction hearing in parts in which applicants sought approval of a Plan under the *Companies Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA.") Approval of the Plan as filed and voted on by Noteholders was opposed by a number of corporate and individual Noteholders, principally on the basis that this Court does not have the jurisdiction under the CCAA or if it does should not exercise discretion to approve third party releases.

History of Proceedings

2 On Monday, March 17, 2008, two Orders were granted. The first, an Initial Order on essentially an *ex parte* basis and in a form that has become familiar to insolvency practitioners, granted a stay of proceedings, a limitation of rights and remedies, the appointment of a Monitor and for service and notice of the Order.

3 The second Order made dated March 17, 2008 provided for a meeting of Noteholders and notice thereof, including the sending of what by then had become the Amended Plan of Compromise and Arrangement. Reasons for Decision were issued on April 8, 2008 elaborating on the basis of the Initial Order.

4 No appeal was taken from either of the Orders of March 17, 2008. Indeed, on the return of a motion made on April 23, 2008 by certain Noteholders (the moving parties) to adjourn the meeting then scheduled for and held on April 25, 2008, no challenge was made to the Initial Order.

5 Information was sought and provided on the issue of classification of Noteholders. The thrust of the Motions was and has been the validity of the releases of various parties provided for in the Plan.

6 The cornerstone to the material filed in support of the Initial Order was the affidavit of Purdy Crawford, O.C., Q.C., Chairman of the Applicant Pan Canadian Investors Committee. There has been no challenge to Mr. Crawford's description of the Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP") market or in general terms the circumstances that led up to the liquidity crisis that occurred in the week of August 13, 2007, or to the formation of the Plan now before the Court.

7 The unchallenged evidence of Mr. Crawford with respect to the nature of the ABCP market and to the development of the Plan is a necessary part of the consideration of the fairness and indeed the jurisdiction, of the Court to approve the form of releases that are said to be integral to the Plan.

8 As will be noted in more detail below, the meeting of Noteholders (however classified) approved the Plan overwhelmingly at the meeting of April 25, 2008.

Background to the Plan

9 Much of the description of the parties and their relationship to the market are by now well known or referred to in the earlier reasons of March 17 or April 4, 2008.

10 The focus here will be on that portion of the background that is necessary for an understanding of and decision on, the issues raised in opposition to the Plan.

11 Not unlike a sporting event that is unfamiliar to some attending without a program, it is difficult to understand the role of various market participants without a description of it. Attached as Appendix 2 are some of the terms that describe the parties, which are from the Glossary that is part of the Information Statement, attached to various of the Monitor's Reports.

12 A list of these entities that fall into various definitional categories reveals that they comprise Canadian chartered banks, Canadian investment houses and foreign banks and financial institutions that may appear in one or more categories of conduits, dealers, liquidity providers, asset providers, sponsors or agents.

13 The following paragraphs from Mr. Crawford's affidavit succinctly summarize the proximate cause of the liquidity crisis, which since August 2007 has frozen the market for ABCP in Canada:

[7] Before the week of August 13, 2007, there was an operating market in ABCP. Various corporations (referred to below as "Sponsors") arranged for the Conduits to make ABCP available as an investment vehicle bearing interest at rates slightly higher than might be available on government or bank short-term paper.

[8] The ABCP represents debts owing by the trustees of the Conduits. Most of the ABCP is short-term commercial paper (usually 30 to 90 days). The balance of the ABCP is made up of commercial paper that is extendible for up to 364 days and longer-term floating rate notes. The money paid by investors to acquire ABCP was used to purchase a portfolio of financial assets to be held, directly or through subsidiary trusts, by the trustees of the Conduits. Repayment of each series of ABCP is supported by the assets held for that series, which serves as collateral for the payment obligations. ABCP is therefore said to be "asset-backed."

[9] Some of these supporting assets were mid-term, but most were long-term, such as pools of residential mortgages, credit card receivables or credit default swaps (which are sophisticated derivative products). Because of the generally long-term nature of the assets backing the ABCP, the cash flow they generated did not match the cash flow required to repay maturing ABCP. Before mid-August 2007, this timing mismatch was not a problem because many investors did not require repayment of ABCP on maturity; instead they reinvested or "rolled" their existing ABCP at maturity. As well, new ABCP was continually being sold, generating funds to repay maturing ABCP where investors required payment. Many of the trustees of the Conduits also entered into back-up liquidity arrangements with

third-party lenders ("Liquidity Providers") who agreed to provide funds to repay maturing ABCP in certain circumstances.

[10] In the week of August 13, 2007, the ABCP market froze. The crisis was largely triggered by market sentiment, as news spread of significant defaults on U.S. sub-prime mortgages. In large part, investors in Canadian ABCP lost confidence because they did not know what assets or mix of assets backed their ABCP. Because of this lack of transparency, existing holders and potential new investors feared that the assets backing the ABCP might include sub-prime mortgages or other overvalued assets. Investors stopped buying new ABCP, and holders stopped "rolling" their existing ABCP. As ABCP became due, Conduits were unable to fund repayments through new issuances or replacement notes. Trustees of some Conduits made requests for advances under the back-up arrangements that were intended to provide liquidity; however, most Liquidity Providers took the position that the conditions to funding had not been met. With no new investment, no reinvestment, and no liquidity funding available, and with long-term underlying assets whose cash flows did not match maturing short-term ABCP, payments due on the ABCP could not be made -- and no payments have been made since mid-August.

14 Between mid-August 2007 and the filing of the Plan, Mr. Crawford and the Applicant Committee have diligently pursued the object of restructuring not just the specific trusts that are part of this Plan, but faith in a market structure that has been a significant part of the broader Canadian financial market, which in turn is directly linked to global financial markets that are themselves in uncertain times.

15 The previous reasons of March 17, 2008 that approved for filing the Initial Plan, recognized not just the unique circumstances facing conduits and their sponsors, but the entire market in Canada for ABCP and the impact for financial markets generally of the liquidity crisis.

16 Unlike many CCAA situations, when at the time of the first appearance there is no plan in sight, much less negotiated, this rescue package has been the product of painstaking, complicated and difficult negotiations and eventually agreement.

17 The following five paragraphs from Mr. Crawford's affidavit crystallize the problem that developed in August 2007:

[45] Investors who bought ABCP often did not know the particular assets or mix of assets that backed their ABCP. In part, this was because ABCP was often issued and sold before or at about the same time the assets were acquired. In addition, many of the assets are extremely complex and parties to some underlying contracts took the position that the terms were confi-

dential.

- [46] Lack of transparency became a significant problem as general market fears about the credit quality of certain types of investment mounted during the summer of 2007. As long as investors were willing to roll their ABCP or buy new ABCP to replace maturing notes, the ABCP market was stable. However, beginning in the first half of 2007, the economy in the United States was shaken by what is referred to as the "sub-prime" lending crisis.
- [47] U.S. sub-prime lending had an impact in Canada because ABCP investors became concerned that the assets underlying their ABCP either included U.S. sub-prime mortgages or were overvalued like the U.S. sub-prime mortgages. The lack of transparency into the pools of assets underlying ABCP made it difficult for investors to know if their ABCP investments included exposure to U.S. sub-prime mortgages or other similar products. In the week of August 13, that concern intensified to the point that investors stopped rolling their maturing ABCP, and instead demanded repayment, and new investors could not be found. Certain trustees of the Conduits then tried to draw on their Liquidity Agreements to repay ABCP. Most of the Liquidity Providers did not agree that the conditions for liquidity funding had occurred and did not provide funding, so the ABCP could not be repaid. Deteriorating conditions in the credit market affected all the ABCP, including ABCP backed by traditional assets not linked to sub-prime lending.
- [48] Some of the Asset Providers made margin calls under LSS swaps on certain of the Conduits, requiring them to post additional collateral. Since they could not issue new ABCP, roll over existing ABCP or draw on their Liquidity Agreements, those Conduits were not able to post the additional collateral. Had there been no standstill arrangement, as described below, these Asset Providers could have unwound the swaps and ultimately could have liquidated the collateral posted by the Conduits.
- [49] Any liquidation of assets under an LSS swap would likely have further depressed the LSS market, creating a domino effect under the remaining LSS swaps by triggering their "mark-to-market" triggers for additional margin calls, ultimately leading to the sale of more assets, at very depressed prices. The standstill arrangement has, to date, through successive extensions, prevented this from occurring, in anticipation of the restructuring.

18 The "Montreal Accord," as it has been called, brought together various industry representatives, Asset Providers and Liquidity Providers who entered into a "Standstill Agreement," which

committed to the framework for restructuring the ABCP such that (a) all outstanding ABCP would be converted into term floating rate notes maturing at the same time as the corresponding underlying assets. This was intended to correct the mismatch between the long-term nature of the financial assets and the short-term nature of the ABCP; and (b) margin provisions under certain swaps would be changed to create renewed stability, reducing the likelihood of margin calls. This contract was intended to reduce the risk that the Conduits would have to post additional collateral for the swap obligations or be subject to having their assets seized and sold, thereby preserving the value of the assets and of the ABCP.

19 The Investors Committee of which Mr. Crawford is the Chair has been at work since September to develop a Plan that could be implemented to restore viability to the notes that have been frozen and restore liquidity so there can be a market for them.

20 Since the Plan itself is not in issue at this hearing (apart from the issue of the releases), it is not necessary to deal with the particulars of the Plan. Suffice to say I am satisfied that as the Information to Noteholders states at p. 69, "The value of the Notes if the Plan does not go forward is highly uncertain."

The Vote

21 A motion was held on April 25, 2008, brought by various corporate and individual Noteholders seeking:

- a) changing classification each in particular circumstances from the one vote per Noteholder regime;
- b) provision of information of various kinds;
- c) adjourning the vote of April 25, 2008 until issues of classification and information were fully dealt with;
- d) amending the Plan to delete various parties from release.

22 By endorsement of April 24, 2008 the issue of releases was in effect adjourned for determination later. The vote was not postponed, as I was satisfied that the Monitor would be able to tally the votes in such a way that any issue of classification could be dealt with at this hearing.

23 I was also satisfied that the Applicants and the Monitor had or would make available any and all information that was in existence and pertinent to the issue of voting. Of understandable concern to those identified as the moving parties are the developments outside the Plan affecting Noteholders holding less than \$1 million of Notes. Certain dealers, Canaccord and National Bank being the most prominent, agreed in the first case to buy their customers' ABCP and in the second to extend financing assistance.

24 A logical conclusion from these developments outside the Plan is that they were designed (with apparent success) to obtain votes in favour of the Plan from various Noteholders.

25 On a one vote per Noteholder basis, the vote was overwhelmingly in favour of the Plan -- approximately 96%. At a case conference held on April 29, 2008, the Monitor was asked to tabulate votes that would isolate into Class A all those entities in any way associated with the formulation of the Plan, whether or not they were Noteholders or sold or advised on notes, and into Class B all other Noteholders.

26 The results of the vote on the Restructuring Resolution, tabulated on the basis set out in paragraph 30 of the Monitor's 7th Report and using the Class structure referred to in the preceding paragraph, are summarized below:

	NUMBER		DOLLAR VALUE	
CLASS A				
Votes FOR the Restructuring Resolution	1,572	99.4%	\$23,898,232,639	100.0%
Votes AGAINST the Restructuring Resolution	9	0.6%	\$ 867,666	0.0%
Class B				
Votes FOR the Restructuring Resolution	289	80.5%	\$ 5,046,951,989	81.2%
Votes AGAINST the Restructuring Resolution	70	19.5%	\$ 1,168,136,123	18.8%

27 I am satisfied that reclassification would not alter the strong majority supporting the Restructuring. The second request made at the case conference on April 29 was that the moving parties provide the Monitor with information that would permit a summary to be compiled of the claims that would have been made or anticipated to be made against so-called third parties, including Conduits and their trustees.

28 The information compiled by the Monitor reveals that the primary defendants are or are anticipated to be banks, including four Canadian chartered banks and dealers (many associated with Canadian banks). In the case of banks, they and their employees may be sued in more than one capacity.

29 The claims against proposed defendants are for the most part claims in tort, and include negligence, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, failure to act prudently as a dealer/adviser, acting in conflict of interest and in a few instances, fraud or potential fraud.

30 Again in general terms, the claims for damages include the face value of notes plus interest and additional penalties and damages that may be allowable at law. It is noteworthy that the moving parties assume that they would be able to mitigate their claim for damages by taking advantage of the Plan offer without the need to provide releases.

31 The information provided by the potential defendants indicates the likelihood of claims over against parties such that no entity, institution or party involved in the Restructuring Plan could be assured being spared from likely involvement in lawsuits by way of third party or other claims over.

32 The chart prepared by the Monitor that is Appendix 3 to these Reasons shows graphically the extent of those entities that would be involved in future litigation. [Editor's note: Appendix 3 was not attached to the copy received from the Court and therefore is not included in the judgment.]

Law and Analysis

33 Some of the moving parties in their written and oral submissions assumed that this Court has the power to amend the Plan to allow for the proposed lawsuits, whether in negligence or fraud. The position of the Applicants and supporting parties is that the Plan is to be accepted on the basis that it satisfies the criteria established under the CCAA, or it will be rejected on the basis that it does not.

34 I am satisfied that the Court does not have the power to amend the Plan. The Plan is that of the Applicants and their supporters. They have made it clear that the Plan is a package that allows only for acceptance or rejection by the Court. The Plan has been amended to address the concerns expressed by the Court in the May 16, 2008 endorsement.

35 I am satisfied and understand that if the Plan is rejected by the Court, either on the basis of fairness (i.e., that claims should be allowed to proceed beyond those provided for in the Plan) or lack of jurisdiction to compel compromise of claims, there is no reliable prospect that the Plan would be revised.

36 I do not consider that the Applicants or those supporting them are bluffing or simply trying to bargain for the best position for themselves possible. The position has been consistent throughout and for what I consider to be good and logical reasons. Those parties described as Asset or Liquidity Providers have a first secured interest in the underlying assets of the Trusts. To say that the value of the underlying assets is uncertain is an understatement after the secured interest of Asset Providers is taken into account.

37 When one looks at the Plan in detail, its intent is to benefit ALL Noteholders. Given the contribution to be made by those supporting the Plan, one can understand why they have said forcefully in effect to the Court, 'We have taken this as far as we can, particularly given the revisions. If it is not accepted by the Court as it has been overwhelmingly by Noteholders, we hold no prospect of another Plan coming forward.'

38 I have carefully considered the submissions of all parties with respect to the issue of releases. I recognize that to a certain extent the issues raised chart new territory. I also recognize that there are legitimate principle-based arguments on both sides.

39 As noted in the Reasons of April 8, 2008 and as reflected in the March 17, 2008 Order and May 16 Endorsement, the Plan represents a highly complex unique situation.

40 The vehicles for the Initial Order are corporations acting in the place of trusts that are insolvent. The trusts and the respondent corporations are not directly related except in the sense that they are all participants in the Canadian market for ABCP. They are each what have been referred to as issuer trustees.

41 There are a great number of other participants in the ABCP market in Canada who are themselves intimately connected with the Plan, either as Sponsors, Asset Providers, Liquidity Providers, participating banks or dealers.

42 I am satisfied that what is sought in this Plan is the restructuring of the ABCP market in Canada and not just the insolvent corporations that are issuer trustees.

43 The impetus for this market restructuring is the Investors Committee chaired by Mr. Crawford. It is important to note that all of the members of the Investors Committee, which comprise 17 financial and investment institutions (see Schedule B, attached), are themselves Noteholders with no other involvement. Three of the members of that Committee act as participants in other capacities.

44 The Initial Order, which no party has appealed or sought to vary or set aside, accepts for the purpose of placing before all Noteholders the revised Plan that is currently before the Court.

45 Those parties who now seek to exclude only some of the Release portions of the Plan do not take issue with the legal or practical basis for the goal of the Plan. Indeed, the statement in the Information to Noteholders, which states that

... as of August 31, 2007, of the total amount of Canadian ABCP outstanding of approximately \$116.8 billion (excluding medium-term and floating rate notes), approximately \$83.8 billion was issued by Canadian Schedule I bank-administered Conduits and approximately \$33 billion was issued by non-bank administered conduits)

is unchallenged.

46 The further description of the ABCP market is also not questioned:

ABCP programs have been used to fund the acquisition of long-term assets, such as mortgages and auto loans. Even when funding short-term assets such as trade receivables, ABCP issuers still face the inherent timing mismatch between cash generated by the underlying assets and the cash needed to repay maturing ABCP. Maturing ABCP is typically repaid with the proceeds of newly issued ABCP, a process commonly referred to as "rolling". Because ABCP is a highly rated commercial obligation with a long history of market acceptance, market participants in Canada formed the view that, absent a "general market disruption", ABCP would readily be saleable without the need for extraordinary funding measures. However, to protect investors in case of a market disruption, ABCP programs typically have provided liquidity back-up facilities, usually in amounts that correspond to the amount of the ABCP outstanding. In the event that an ABCP issuer is unable to issue new ABCP, it may be able to draw down on the liquidity facility to ensure that proceeds are available to repay any maturing ABCP. As discussed below, there have been important distinctions between different kinds of liquidity agreements as to the nature and scope of drawing conditions which give rise to an obligation of a liquidity provider to fund²

47 The activities of the Investors Committee, most of whom are themselves Noteholders without other involvement, have been lauded as innovative, pioneering and essential to the success of

the Plan. In my view, it is entirely inappropriate to classify the vast majority of the Investors Committee, and indeed other participants who were not directly engaged in the sale of Notes, as third parties.

48 Given the nature of the ABCP market and all of its participants, it is more appropriate to consider all Noteholders as claimants and the object of the Plan to restore liquidity to the assets being the Notes themselves. The restoration of the liquidity of the market necessitates the participation (including more tangible contribution by many) of all Noteholders.

49 In these circumstances, it is unduly technical to classify the Issuer Trustees as debtors and the claims of Noteholders as between themselves and others as being those of third party creditors, although I recognize that the restructuring structure of the CCAA requires the corporations as the vehicles for restructuring.

50 The insolvency is of the ABCP market itself, the restructuring is that of the market for such paper -- restructuring that involves the commitment and participation of all parties. The Latin words *sui generis* are used to mean something that is "one off" or "unique." That is certainly the case with this Plan.

51 The Plan, including all of its constituent parts, has been overwhelmingly accepted by Noteholders no matter how they are classified. In the sense of their involvement I do not think it appropriate to label any of the participants as Third Parties. Indeed, as this matter has progressed, additions to the supporter side have included for the proposed releases the members of the Ad Hoc Investors' Committee. The Ad Hoc group had initially opposed the release provisions. The Committee members account for some two billion dollars' worth of Notes.

52 It is more appropriate to consider all participants part of the market for the restructuring of ABCP and therefore not merely third parties to those Noteholders who may wish to sue some or all of them.

53 The benefit of the restructuring is only available to the debtor corporations with the input, contribution and direct assistance of the Applicant Noteholders and those associated with them who similarly contribute. Restructuring of the ABCP market cannot take place without restructuring of the Notes themselves. Restructuring of the Notes cannot take place without the input and capital to the insolvent corporations that replace the trusts.

54 A hearing was held on May 12 and 13 to hear the objections of various Noteholders to approval of the Plan insofar as it provided for comprehensive releases.

55 On May 16, 2008, by way of endorsement the issue of scope of the proposed releases was addressed. The following paragraphs from the endorsement capsulize the adjournment that was granted on the issue of releases:

[10] I am not satisfied that the release proposed as part of the Plan, which is broad enough to encompass release from fraud, is in the circumstances of this case at this time properly authorized by the CCAA, or is necessarily fair and reasonable. I simply do not have sufficient facts at this time on which to reach a conclusion one way or another.

[11] I have also reached the conclusion that in the circumstances of this Plan, at this time, it may well be appropriate to approve releases that would circumscribe claims for negligence. I recognize the different legal positions but am satisfied that this Plan will not proceed unless negligence claims are released.

56 The endorsement went on to elaborate on the particular concerns that I had with releases sought by the Applicants that could in effect exonerate fraud. As well, concern was expressed that the Plan might unduly bring hardship to some Noteholders over others.

57 I am satisfied that based on Mr. Crawford's affidavit and the statements commencing at p. 126 of the Information to Noteholders, a compelling case for the need for comprehensive releases, with the exception of certain fraud claims, has been made out.

The Released Parties have made comprehensive releases a condition of their participation in the Plan or as parties to the Approved Agreements. Each Released Party is making a necessary contribution to the Plan without which the Plan cannot be implemented. The Asset Providers, in particular, have agreed to amend certain of the existing contracts and/or enter into new contracts that, among other things, will restructure the trigger covenants, thereby increasing their risk of loss and decreasing the risk of losses being borne by Noteholders. In addition, the Asset Providers are making further contributions that materially improve the position of Noteholders generally, including through forbearing from making collateral calls since August 15, 2007, participating in the MAV2 Margin Funding Facility at pricing favourable to the Noteholders, accepting additional collateral at par with respect to the Traditional Assets and disclosing confidential information, none of which they are contractually obligated to do. The ABCP Sponsors have also released confidential information, co-operated with the Investors Committee and its advisors in the development of the Plan, released their claims in respect of certain future fees that would accrue to them in respect of the assets and are assisting in the transition of administration services to the Asset Administrator, should the Plan be implemented. The Original Issuer Trustees, the Issuer Trustees, the Existing Note Indenture Trustees and the Rating Agency have assisted in the restructuring process as needed and have co-operated with the Investors Committee in facilitating an essential aspect of the court proceedings required to complete the restructuring of the ABCP Conduits through the replacement of the Original Issuer Trustees where required.

In many instances, a party had a number of relationships in different capacities with numerous trades or programs of an ABCP Conduit, rendering it difficult or impracticable to identify and/or quantify any individual Released Party's contribution. Certain of the Released Parties may have contributed more to the Plan than others. However, in order for the releases to be comprehensive, the Released Parties (including those Released Parties without which no restructuring could occur) require that all Released Parties be included so that one Person who is not

released by the Noteholders is unable to make a claim-over for contribution from a Released Party and thereby defeat the effectiveness of the releases. Certain entities represented on the Investors Committee have also participated in the Third-Party ABCP market in a variety of capacities other than as Noteholders and, accordingly, are also expected to benefit from these releases.

The evidence is unchallenged.

58 The questions raised by moving parties are (a) does the Court have jurisdiction to approve a Plan under the CCAA that provides for the releases in question?; and if so, (b) is it fair and reasonable that certain identified dealers and others be released?

59 I am also satisfied that those parties and institutions who were involved in the ABCP market directly at issue and those additional parties who have agreed solely to assist in the restructuring have valid and legitimate reasons for seeking such releases. To exempt some Noteholders from release provisions not only leads to the failure of the Plan, it does likely result in many Noteholders having to pursue fraud or negligence claims to obtain any redress, since the value of the assets underlying the Notes may, after first security interests be negligible.

Restructuring under the CCAA

60 This Application has brought into sharp focus the purpose and scope of the CCAA. It has been accepted for the last 15 years that the issue of releases beyond directors of insolvent corporations dates from the decision in *Canadian Airlines Corp. (Re)*,³ where Paperny J. said:

[87] Prior to 1997, the CCAA did not provide for compromises of claims against anyone other than the petitioning company. In 1997, section 5.1 was added to the CCAA. Section 5.1 states:

- 5.1
- (1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.
 - (2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that:
 - (a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or
 - (b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

- (3) The Court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

61 The following paragraphs from that decision are reproduced at some length, since, in the submission principally of Mr. Woods, the releases represent an illegal or improper extension of the wording of the CCAA. Mr. Woods takes issue with the reasoning in the *Canadian Airlines* decision, which has been widely referred to in many cases since. Mme Justice Paperny continued:

[88] Resurgence argued that the form of release does not comply with section 5.1 of the CCAA insofar as it applies to individuals beyond directors and to a broad spectrum of claims beyond obligations of the Petitioners for which their directors are "by law liable". Resurgence submitted that the addition of section 5.1 to the CCAA constituted an exception to a long standing principle and urged the court to therefore interpret s. 5.1 cautiously, if not narrowly.

...

[92] While it is true that section 5.2 of the CCAA does not authorize a release of claims against third parties other than directors, it does not prohibit such releases either. The amended terms of the release will not prevent claims from which the CCAA expressly prohibits release. Aside from the complaints of Resurgence, which by their own submissions are addressed in the amendment I have directed, and the complaints of JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2, which would also be addressed in the amendment, the terms of the release have been accepted by the requisite majority of creditors and I am loathe to further disturb the terms of the Plan, with one exception. [Emphasis added.]

[93] Amex Bank of Canada submitted that the form of release appeared overly broad and might compromise unaffected claims of affected creditors. For further clarification, Amex Bank of Canada's potential claim for defamation is unaffected by the Plan and I am prepared to order Section 6.2(2)(ii) be amended to reflect this specific exception.

[94] In determining whether to sanction a plan of arrangement under the CCAA, the court is guided by two fundamental concepts: "fairness" and "reasonableness". While these concepts are always at the heart of the court's exercise of its discretion, their meanings are necessarily shaped by

the unique circumstances of each case, within the context of the Act and accordingly can be difficult to distill and challenging to apply. Blair J. described these concepts in *Olympia and York Dev. Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.*^[4] at page 9:

"Fairness" and "reasonableness" are, in my opinion, the two keynote concepts underscoring the philosophy and workings of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. Fairness is the quintessential expression of the court's equitable jurisdiction -- although the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad discretionary powers given to the judiciary by the legislation which make its exercise an exercise in equity -- and "reasonableness" is what lends objectivity to the process.

- [95] The legislation, while conferring broad discretion on the court, offers little guidance. However, the court is assisted in the exercise of its discretion by the purpose of the CCAA: to facilitate the reorganization of a debtor company for the benefit of the company, its creditors, shareholders, employees and, in many instances, a much broader constituency of affected persons. Parliament has recognized that reorganization, if commercially feasible, is in most cases preferable, economically and socially, to liquidation: *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.*, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566 at 574 (Alta.Q.B.); *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 at 368 (B.C.C.A.).
- [96] The sanction of the court of a creditor-approved plan is not to be considered as a rubber stamp process. Although the majority vote that brings the plan to a sanction hearing plays a significant role in the court's assessment, the court will consider other matters as are appropriate in light of its discretion. In the unique circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to consider a number of additional matters:
- a. The composition of the unsecured vote;
 - b. What creditors would receive on liquidation or bankruptcy as compared to the Plan;
 - c. Alternatives available to the Plan and bankruptcy;
 - d. Oppression;
 - e. Unfairness to Shareholders of CAC; and
 - f. The public interest.

[97] As noted above, an important measure of whether a plan is fair and reasonable is the parties' approval and the degree to which it has been given. Creditor support creates an inference that the plan is fair and reasonable because the assenting creditors believe that their interests are treated equitably under the plan. Moreover, it creates an inference that the arrangement is economically feasible and therefore reasonable because the creditors are in a better position than the courts to gauge business risk. As stated by Blair J. at page 11 of *Olympia & York Developments Ltd.*, *supra*:

As other courts have done, I observe that it is not my function to second guess the business people with respect to the "business" aspect of the Plan or descending into the negotiating arena or substituting my own view of what is a fair and reasonable compromise or arrangement for that of the business judgment of the participants. The parties themselves know best what is in their interests in those areas.

62 The liberal interpretation to be given to the CCAA was and has been accepted in Ontario. In *Canadian Red Cross Society (Re)*⁵, Blair J. (as he then was) has been referred to with approval in later cases:

[45] It is very common in CCAA restructurings for the Court to approve the sale and disposition of assets during the process and before the Plan if formally tendered and voted upon. There are many examples where this had occurred, the recent Eaton's restructuring being only one of them. The CCAA is designed to be a flexible instrument, and it is that very flexibility which gives it its efficacy. As Farley J said in *Dylex Ltd.*, [1995] O.J. No. 595, *supra* (p. 111), "the history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation". It is not infrequently that judges are told, by those opposing a particular initiative at a particular time, that if they make a particular order that is requested it will be the first time in Canadian jurisprudence (sometimes in global jurisprudence, depending upon the level of the rhetoric) that such an order has made! Nonetheless, the orders are made, if the circumstances are appropriate and the orders can be made within the framework and in the spirit of the CCAA legislation. Mr. Justice Farley has well summarized this approach in the following passage from his decision in *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at p. 31, which I adopt:

The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bank-

ruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course *or otherwise deal with their assets* so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. See the preamble to and sections 4,5,7,8 and 11 of the CCAA (a lengthy list of authorities cited here is omitted).

The CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Where a debtor company realistically plans to continue operating *or to otherwise deal with its assets* but it requires the protection of the court in order to do so and it is otherwise too early for the court to determine whether the debtor company will succeed, relief should be granted under the CCAA (citations omitted)

[Emphasis added]

63 In a 2006 decision in *Muscletech Research and Development Inc. (Re)*⁶, which adopted the *Canadian Airlines* test, Ground J. said:

[7] With respect to the relief sought relating to Claims against Third Parties, the position of the Objecting Claimants appears to be that this court lacks jurisdiction to make any order affecting claims against third parties who are not applicants in a CCAA proceeding. I do not agree. In the case at bar, the whole plan of compromise which is being funded by Third Parties will not proceed unless the plan provides for a resolution of all claims against the Applicants and Third Parties arising out of "the development, advertising and marketing, and sale of health supplements, weight loss and sports nutrition or other products by the Applicants or any of them" as part of a global resolution of the litigation commenced in the United States. In his Endorsement of January 18, 2006, Farley J. stated:

"the Product Liability system vis-à-vis the Non-Applicants appears to be in essence derivative of claims against the Applicants and it would neither be logical nor practical/functional to have that Product Liability litigation not be dealt with on an all encompassing basis."

64 This decision is also said to be beyond the Court's jurisdiction to follow.

65 In a later decision⁷ in the same matter, Ground J. said in 2007:

- [18] It has been held that in determining whether to sanction a plan, the court must exercise its equitable jurisdiction and consider the prejudice to the various parties that would flow from granting or refusing to grant approval of the plan and must consider alternatives available to the Applicants if the plan is not approved. An important factor to be considered by the court in determining whether the plan is fair and reasonable is the degree of approval given to the plan by the creditors. It has also been held that, in determining whether to approve the plan, a court should not second-guess the business aspects of the plan or substitute its views for that of the stakeholders who have approved the plan.
- [19] In the case at bar, all of such considerations, in my view must lead to the conclusion that the Plan is fair and reasonable. On the evidence before this court, the Applicants have no assets and no funds with which to fund a distribution to creditors. Without the Contributed Funds there would be no distribution made and no Plan to be sanctioned by this court. Without the Contributed Funds, the only alternative for the Applicants is bankruptcy and it is clear from the evidence before this court that the unsecured creditors would receive nothing in the event of bankruptcy.
- [20] A unique feature of this Plan is the Releases provided under the Plan to Third Parties in respect of claims against them in any way related to "the research, development, manufacture, marketing, sale, distribution, application, advertising, supply, production, use or ingestion of products sold, developed or distributed by or on behalf of" the Applicants (see Article 9.1 of the Plan). It is self-evident, and the Subject Parties have confirmed before this court, that the Contributed Funds would not be established unless such Third Party Releases are provided and accordingly, in my view it is fair and reasonable to provide such Third Party releases in order to establish a fund to provide for distributions to creditors of the Applicants. With respect to support of the Plan, in addition to unanimous approval of the Plan by the creditors represented at meetings of creditors, several other stakeholder groups support the sanctioning of the Plan, including Iovate Health Sciences Inc. and its subsidiaries (excluding the Applicants) (collectively, the "Iovate Companies"), the Ad Hoc Committee of MuscleTech Tort Claimants, GN Oldco, Inc. f/k/a General Nutrition Corporation, Zurich American Insurance Company, Zurich Insurance Company, HVL, Inc. and XL Insurance America Inc. It is particularly significant that the Monitor supports the sanctioning of the Plan.
- [21] With respect to balancing prejudices, if the Plan is not sanctioned, in addition to the obvious prejudice to the creditors who would receive nothing by

way of distribution in respect of their claims, other stakeholders and Third Parties would continue to be mired in extensive, expensive and in some cases conflicting litigation in the United States with no predictable outcome.

66 I recognize that in *Muscletech*, as in other cases such as *Vicwest Corp. (Re)*,⁸ there has been no direct opposition to the releases in those cases. The concept that has been accepted is that the Court does have jurisdiction, taking into account the nature and purpose of the CCAA, to sanction release of third parties where the factual circumstances are deemed appropriate for the success of a Plan.⁹

67 The moving parties rely on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in *NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc.*¹⁰ for the proposition that compromise of claims in negligence against those associated with a debtor corporation within a CCAA context is not permitted.

68 The claim in that case was by NBD as a creditor of Algoma Steel, then under CCAA protection against its parent Dofasco and an officer of both Algoma and Dofasco. The claim was for negligent misrepresentation by which NBD was induced to advance funds to Algoma shortly before the CCAA filing.

69 In the approved CCAA order only the debtor Algoma was released. The Court of Appeal held that the benefit of the release did not extend to officers of Algoma or to the parent corporation Dofasco or its officers.

70 Rosenberg J.A. writing for the Court said:

[51] Algoma commenced the process under the CCAA on February 18, 1991. The process was a lengthy one and the Plan of Arrangement was approved by Farley J. in April 1992. The Plan had previously been accepted by the overwhelming majority of creditors and others with an interest in Algoma. The Plan of Arrangement included the following term:

6.03 Releases

From and after the Effective Date, each Creditor and Shareholder of Algoma prior to the Effective Date (other than Dofasco) will be deemed to forever release Algoma from any and all suits, claims and causes of action that it may have had against Algoma or its directors, officers, employees and advisors. [Emphasis added.]

...

[54] In fact, to refuse on policy grounds to impose liability on an officer of the corporation for negligent misrepresentation would contradict the policy of

Parliament as demonstrated in recent amendments to the CCAA and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. Those Acts now contemplate that an arrangement or proposal may include a term for compromise of certain types of claims against directors of the company except claims that "are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors". L. W. Houlden and C. H. Morawetz, the editors of *The 2000 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at p. 192 are of the view that the policy behind the provision is to encourage directors of an insolvent corporation to remain in office so that the affairs of the corporation can be reorganized. I can see no similar policy interest in barring an action against an officer of the company who, prior to the insolvency, has misrepresented the financial affairs of the corporation to its creditors. It may be necessary to permit the compromise of claims against the debtor corporation, otherwise it may not be possible to successfully reorganize the corporation. The same considerations do not apply to individual officers. Rather, it would seem to me that it would be contrary to good policy to immunize officers from the consequences of their negligent statements which might otherwise be made in anticipation of being forgiven under a subsequent corporate proposal or arrangement. [Reference omitted]

71 In my view, there is little factual similarity in *NBD* to the facts now before the Court. In this case, I am not aware of any claims sought to be advanced against directors of Issuer Trustees. The release of Algoma in the *NBD* case did not on its face extend to Dofasco, the third party. Accordingly, I do not find the decision helpful to the issue now before the Court. The moving parties also rely on decisions involving another steel company, Stelco, in support of the proposition that a CCAA Plan cannot be used to compromise claims as between creditors of the debtor company.

72 In *Stelco Inc. (Re)*,¹¹ Farley J., dealing with classification, said in November 2005:

[7] The CCAA is styled as "An act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors" and its short title is: *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. Ss. 4, 5 and 6 talk of compromises or arrangements between a company and its creditors. There is no mention of this extending by statute to encompass a change of relationship among the creditors vis-à-vis the creditors themselves and not directly involving the company. See *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada*, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2580 (S.C.) at paras. 24-25; *Royal Bank of Canada v. Gentra Canada Investments Inc.*, [2000] O.J. No. 315 (S.C.J.) at para. 41, appeal dismissed [2001] O.J. No. 2344 (C.A.); *Re 843504 Alberta Ltd.*, [2003] A.J. No. 1549 (Q.B.) at para. 13; *Re Royal Oak Mines Inc.*, [1999] O.J. No. 709 (Gen. Div.) at para. 24; *Re Royal Oak Mines Inc.*, [1999] O.J. No. 864 (Gen. Div.) at para. 1.

73 The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from that decision.¹² Blair J.A., quoting Paperny J. in *Re Canadian Airlines Corp.*, *supra*, said:

[23] In *Re Canadian Airlines Corp.* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 12 (Alta. Q.B.), Paperny J. nonetheless extracted a number of principles to be considered by the courts in dealing with the commonality of interest test. At para. 31 she said:

In summary, the cases establish the following principles applicable to assessing commonality of interest:

1. Commonality of interest should be viewed based on the non-fragmentation test, not on an identity of interest test;
2. The interests to be considered are the legal interests that a creditor holds qua creditor in relationship to the debtor company prior to and under the plan as well as on liquidation.
3. The commonality of interests are to be viewed purposively, bearing in mind the object of the C.C.C.A., namely to facilitate reorganizations if possible.
4. In placing a broad and purposive interpretation on the C.C.C.A., the court should be careful to resist classification approaches that would potentially jeopardize viable plans.
5. Absent bad faith, the motivations of creditors to approve or disapprove [of the Plan] are irrelevant.
6. The requirement of creditors being able to consult together means being able to assess their legal entitlement *as creditors* before or after the plan in a similar manner.

[24] In developing this summary of principles, Paperny J. considered a number of authorities from across Canada, including the following: *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 20 (Alta. Q.B.); *Re Fairview Industries Ltd.* (1991), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 71 (N.S.T.D.); *Re Woodward's Ltd.* 1993 CanLII 870 (BC S.C.), (1993), 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 206 (B.C.S.C.); *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 166 (B.C.S.C.); *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada* (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C.C.A.); *Re NsC Diesel Power Inc.* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1 (N.S.T.D.); *Savage v. Amoco Acquisition Co.* (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 154, (*sub nom. Amoco Acquisition Co. v. Savage*) (Alta. C.A.); *Re Wellington Building Corp.* (1934), 16 C.B.R. 48 (Ont. H.C.J.). Her summarized principles were cited by the Alberta Court of Appeal, apparently with

approval, in a subsequent *Canadian Airlines* decision: *Re Canadian Airlines Corp.* 2000 ABCA 149 (CanLII), (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 33 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 27.

...

- [32] First, as the supervising judge noted, the CCAA itself is more compendiously styled "An act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors". There is no mention of dealing with issues that would change the nature of the relationships as between the creditors themselves. As Tysoe J. noted in *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada* [2001] B.C.J. No. 2580 (B.C.S.C.) at para. 24 (after referring to the full style of the legislation):

[The purpose of the CCAA proceeding] is not to deal with disputes between a creditor of a company and a third party, even if the company was also involved in the subject matter of the dispute. While issues between the debtor company and non-creditors are sometimes dealt with in CCAA proceedings, it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company.

- [33] In this particular case, the supervising judge was very careful to say that nothing in his reasons should be taken to determine or affect the relationship between the Subordinate Debenture Holders and the Senior Debt Holders.
- [34] Secondly, it has long been recognized that creditors should be classified in accordance with their contract rights, that is, according to their respective interests in the debtor company: see Stanley E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947) 25 Can. Bar. Rev. 587, at p. 602.
- [35] Finally, to hold the classification and voting process hostage to the vagaries of a potentially infinite variety of disputes as between already disgruntled creditors who have been caught in the maelstrom of a CCAA restructuring, runs the risk of hobbling that process unduly. It could lead to the very type of fragmentation and multiplicity of discrete classes or sub-classes of classes that judges and legal writers have warned might well

defeat the purpose of the Act: see Stanley Edwards, "Reorganizations under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", *supra*; Ronald N. Robertson Q.C., "Legal Problems on Reorganization of Major Financial and Commercial Debtors", Canadian Bar Association -- Ontario Continuing Legal Education, 5th April 1983 at 19-21; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.*, *supra*, at para. 27; *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*, *supra*; *Sklar-Peppler*, *supra*; *Re Woodward's Ltd.*, *supra*.

- [36] In the end, it is important to remember that classification of creditors, like most other things pertaining to the CCAA, must be crafted with the underlying purpose of the CCAA in mind, namely facilitation of the reorganization of an insolvent company through the negotiation and approval of a plan of compromise or arrangement between the debtor company and its creditors, so that the debtor company can continue to carry on its business to the benefit of all concerned. As Paperny J. noted in *Re Canadian Airlines*, "the Court should be careful to resist classification approaches that would potentially jeopardize viable Plans."

74 In 2007, in *Stelco Inc. (Re)*¹³, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a further appeal and held:

- [44] We note that this approach of delaying the resolution of inter-creditor disputes is not inconsistent with the scheme of the CCAA. In a ruling made on November 10, 2005, in the proceedings relating to Stelco reported at 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297, Farley J. expressed this point (at para. 7) as follows:

The CCAA is styled as "An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors" and its short title is: *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. Ss. 4, 5 and 6 talk of compromises or arrangements between a company and its creditors. There is no mention of this extending by statute to encompass a change of relationship among the creditors *vis-à-vis* the creditors themselves and not directly involving the company.

- [45] Thus, we agree with the motion judge's interpretation of s. 6.01(2). The result of this interpretation is that the Plan extinguished the provisions of the Note Indenture respecting the rights and obligations as between Stelco and the Noteholders on the Effective Date. However, the Turnover Provisions, which relate only to the rights and obligations between the Senior Debt Holders and the Noteholders, were intended to continue to operate.

75 I have quoted from the above decisions at length since they support rather than detract from the basic principle that in my view is operative in this instance.

76 I do not consider that the Plan in this case involves a change in relationship among creditors "that does not directly involve the Company." Those who support the Plan and are to be released are "directly involved in the Company" in the sense that many are foregoing immediate rights to assets and are providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes. It would be unduly restrictive to suggest that the moving parties' claims against released parties do not involve the Company, since the claims are directly related to the value of the Notes. The value of the Notes is in this case the value of the Company.

77 This Plan, as it deals with releases, doesn't change the relationship of the creditors apart from involving the Company and its Notes. The only contract between creditors in this case relates directly to the Notes.

U.S. Law

78 Issue was taken by some counsel for parties opposing the Plan with the comments of Justice Ground in *Muscletech* [2007]¹⁴ at paragraph 26, to the effect that third party creditor releases have been recognized under United States bankruptcy law. I accept the comment of Mr. Woods that the U.S. provisions involve a different statute with different language and therefore different considerations.

79 That does not mean that the U.S. law is to be completely ignored. It is instructive to consideration of the release issue under the CCAA to know that there has been a principled debate within judicial circles in the United States on the issue of releases in a bankruptcy proceeding of those who are not themselves directly parties in bankruptcy.

80 A very comprehensive article authored by Joshua M. Silverstein of Emory University School of Law in 2006, 23 Bank. Dev. J. 13, outlines both the line of U.S. decisions that hold that bankruptcy courts may not use their general equitable powers to modify non-bankruptcy rights, and those that hold that non-bankruptcy law is not an absolute bar to the exercise of equitable powers, particularly with respect to third party releases.

81 The author concludes at paragraph 137 that a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in *United States v. Energy Resources* 495 US545 (1990) offers crucial support for the pro-release position.

82 I do not take any of the statements to referencing U.S. law on this topic as being directly applicable to the case now before this Court, except to say that in resolving a very legitimate debate, it is appropriate to do so in a purposive way but also very much within a case-specific fact-contextual approach, which seems to be supported by the United States Supreme Court decision above.

Steinberg Decision

83 Against the authorities referred to above, those opposed to the Plan releases rely on the June 16, 1993 decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Michaud v. Steinberg Inc.*¹⁵

84 Mr. Woods for some of the moving parties urges that the decision, which he asserts makes third party releases illegal, is still good law and binding on this Court, since no other Court of Ap-

peal in Canada has directly considered or derogated from the result. (It appears that the decision has not been reported in English, which may explain some of the absence of comment.)

85 The Applicants not surprisingly take an opposite view. Counsel submits that undoubtedly in direct response to the *Steinberg* decision, Parliament added s. 5.1 (see above paragraph [60]) thereby opening the door for the analysis that has followed with the decisions of *Canadian Airlines*, *Muscletech* and others. In other words, it is urged the caselaw that has developed in the 15 years since *Steinberg* now provide a basis for recognition of third party releases in appropriate circumstances.

86 The *Steinberg* decision dealt directly with releases proposed for acts of directors. The decision appears to have focused on the nature of the contract created and binding between creditors and the company when the plan is approved. I accept that the effect of a Court-approved CCAA Plan is to impose a contract on creditors.

87 Reliance is placed on the decision of Deschamps J.A. (as she then was) at the following paragraphs of the *Steinberg* decision:

- [54] Even if one can understand the extreme pressure weighing on the creditors and the respondent at the time of the sanctioning, a plan of arrangement is not the appropriate forum to settle disputes other than the claims that are the subject of the arrangement. In other words, one cannot, under the pretext of an absence of formal directives in the Act, transform an arrangement into a potpourri.
- [57] If the arrangement is imposed on the dissenting creditors, it means that the rules of civil law founded on consent are set aside, at least with respect to them. One cannot impose on creditors, against their will, consequences that are attached to the rules of contracts that are freely agreed to, like releases and other notions to which clauses 5.3 and 12.6 refer. Consensus corresponds to a reality quite different from that of the majorities provided for in section 6 of the Act and cannot be attributed to dissenting creditors.
- [59] Under the Act, the sanctioning judgment is required for the arrangement to bind all the creditors, including those who do not consent to it. The sanctioning cannot have as a consequence to extend the effect of the Act. As the clauses in the arrangement founded on the rules of the Civil Code are foreign to the Act, the sanctioning cannot have any effect on them.
- [68] The Act offers the respondent a way to arrive at a compromise with its creditors. It does not go so far as to offer an umbrella to all the persons within its orbit by permitting them to shelter themselves from any recourse.

[74] If an arrangement is imposed on a creditor that prevents him from recovering part of his claim by the effect of the Act, he does not necessarily lose the benefit of other statutes that he may wish to invoke. In this sense, if the Civil Code provides a recourse in civil liability against the directors or officers, this right of the creditor cannot be wiped out, against his will, by the inclusion of a release in an arrangement.

88 If it were necessary to do so, I would accept the position of the Applicants that the history of judicial interpretation of the CCAA at both the appellate and trial levels in Canada, along with the change to s. 5.1, leaves the decision in *Steinberg* applicable to a prior era only.

89 I do not think it necessary to go that far, however. One must remember that *Steinberg* dealt with release of claims against directors. As Mme. Justice Deschamps said at paragraph 54, "[A] plan of arrangement is not the appropriate forum to settle disputes other than the claims that are the subject of the arrangement."

90 In this case, all the Noteholders have a common claim, namely to maximize the value obtainable under their notes. The anticipated increase in the value of the notes is directly affected by the risk and contribution that will be made by asset and liquidity providers.

91 In my view, depriving all Noteholders from achieving enhanced value of their notes to permit a few to pursue negligence claims that do not affect note value is quite a different set of circumstances from what was before the Court in *Steinberg*. Different in kind and quality.

92 The sponsoring parties have accepted the policy concern that exempting serious claims such as some frauds could not be regarded as fair and reasonable within the context of the spirit and purpose of the CCAA.

93 The sponsoring parties have worked diligently to respond to that concern and have developed an exemption to the release that in my view fairly balances the rights of Noteholders with serious claims, with the risk to the Plan as a whole.

Statutory Interpretation of the CCAA

94 Reference was made during argument by counsel to some of the moving parties to rules of statutory interpretation that would suggest that the Court should not go beyond the plain and ordinary words used in the statute.

95 Various of the authorities referred to above emphasize the remedial nature of the legislation, which leaves to the greatest extent possible the stakeholders of the debtor corporation to decide what Plan will or will not be accepted with the scope of the statute.

96 The nature and extent of judicial interpretation and innovation in insolvency matters has been the subject of recent academic and judicial comment.

97 Most recently, Madam Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Dr. Janis Sarra in "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters,"¹⁶ wrote:

The paper advances the thesis that in addressing the problem of under-inclusive or skeletal legislation, there is a hierarchy or appropriate order of utilization of judicial tools. First, the courts should engage in statutory interpretation to determine the limits of authority, adopting a broad, liberal and purposive interpretation that may reveal the authority. We suggest that it is important that courts first interpret the statute before them and exercise their authority pursuant to the statute, before reaching for other tools in the judicial tool box. Examination of the statutory language and framework of the legislation may reveal a discretion, and statutory interpretation may determine the extent of the discretion or statutory interpretation may reveal a gap. The common law may permit the gap to be filled; if it does, the chambers judge still has a discretion as to whether he or she invokes the authority to fill the gap. The exercise of inherent jurisdiction may fill the gap; if it does, the chambers judge still has a discretion as to whether he or she invokes the authority revealed by the discovery of inherent jurisdiction. This paper considers these issues at some length.¹⁷

Second, we suggest that inherent jurisdiction is a misnomer for much of what has occurred in decision making under the CCAA. Appeal court judgments in cases such as *Skeena Cellulose Inc.*, [2003] B.C.J. No. 1335, and *Stelco* discussed below, have begun to articulate this view. As part of this observation, we suggest that for the most part, the exercise of the court's authority is frequently, although not exclusively, made on the basis of statutory interpretation.¹⁸

Third, in the context of commercial law, a driving principle of the courts is that they are on a quest to do what makes sense commercially in the context of what is the fairest and most equitable in the circumstances. The establishment of specialized commercial lists or rosters in jurisdictions such as Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan are aimed at the same goal, creating an expeditious and efficient forum for the fair resolution of commercial disputes effectively and on a timely basis. Similarly, the standards of review applied by appellate courts, in the context of commercial matters, have regard to the specialized expertise of the court of first instance and demonstrate a commitment to effective processes for the resolution of commercial disputes.¹⁹ [cites omitted]

98 The case now before the Court does not involve confiscation of any rights in Notes themselves; rather the opposite: the opportunity in the business circumstances to maximize the value of the Notes. The authors go on to say at p. 45:

Iacobucci J., writing for the Court in *Rizzo Shoes*, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, reaffirmed Driedger's Modern Principle as the best approach to interpretation of the legislation and stated that "statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone". He considered the history of the legislation and the benefit-conferring nature of the legislation and examined the purpose and object of the Act, the nature of the legislation and the consequences of a contrary finding, which he labeled an absurd result. Iacobucci J. also relied on s. 10 of the *Interpretation Act*, which provides that every Act "shall be deemed to be remedial" and directs that every Act "shall accordingly receive such fair, large and liberal

construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning and spirit". The Court held:

23 Although the Court of Appeal looked to the plain meaning of the specific provisions in question in the present case, with respect, I believe that the court did not pay sufficient attention to the scheme of the ESA, its object or the intention of the legislature; nor was the context of the words in issue appropriately recognized. I now turn to a discussion of these issues.

...

40 As I see the matter, when the express words of ss. 40 and 40a of the ESA are examined in their entire context, there is ample support for the conclusion that the words "terminated by the employer" must be interpreted to include termination resulting from the bankruptcy of the employer. Using the broad and generous approach to interpretation appropriate for benefits-conferring legislation, I believe that these words can reasonably bear that construction.

Thus, in *Rizzo Shoes* we see the Court extending the legislation or making explicit that which was implicit only, as it were, by reference to the Modern Principle, the purpose and object of the Act and the consequences of a contrary result. No reference is made to filling the legislative gap, but rather, the Court is addressing a fact pattern not explicitly contemplated by the legislation and extending the legislation to that fact pattern.

Professor Cote also sees the issue of legislative gaps as part of the discussion of "legislative purpose", which finds expression in the codification of the mischief rule by the various Canadian interpretation statutes. The ability to extend the meaning of the provision finds particular expression when one considers the question posed by him: "can the purposive method make up for lacunae in the legislation". He points out, as does Professor Sullivan, that the courts have not provided a definitive answer, but that for him there are two schools of thought. One draws on the "literal rule" which favours judicial restraint, whereas the other, the "mischief rule", "posits correction of the text to make up for lacunae." To temper the extent of the literal rule, Professor Cote states:

First, the judge is not legislating by adding what is already implicit. The issue is not the judge's power to actually add terms to a statute, but rather whether a particular concept is sufficiently implicit in the words of an enactment for the judge to allow it to produce effect, and if so, whether there is any principle preventing the judge from making explicit what is already implicit. Parliament is required to be particularly explicit with some types of legislation such as expropriation statutes, for example.

Second, the Literal Rule suggests that as soon as the courts play any creative role in settling a dispute rather than merely administering the law, they assume the duties of Parliament. But by their very nature, judicial functions have a certain creative component. If the law is silent or unclear, the judge is still required to arrive at a decision. In doing so, he [she] may quite possibly be required to define rules which go beyond the written expression of the statute, but which in no way violate its spirit.

In certain situations, the courts may refuse to correct lacunae in legislation. This is not necessarily because of a narrow definition of their role, but rather because general principles of interpretation require the judge, in some areas, to insist on explicit indications of legislative intent. It is common, for example, for judges to refuse to fill in the gaps in a tax statute, a retroactive law, or legislation that severely affects property rights. [Emphasis added. Footnotes omitted.]²⁰

99 The modern purposive approach is now well established in interpreting CCAA provisions, as the authors note. The phrase more than any other with which issue is taken by the moving parties is that of Paperny J. that s. 5 of the CCAA does not preclude releases other than those specified in s. 5.1.

100 In this analysis, I adopt the purposive language of the authors at pp. 55-56:

It may be that with the increased codification in statutes, courts have lost sight of their general jurisdiction where there is a gap in the statutory language. Where there is a highly codified statute, courts may conclude that there is less room to undertake gap-filling. This is accurate insofar as the Parliament or Legislative Assembly has limited or directed the court's general jurisdiction; there is less likely to be a gap to fill. However, as the Ontario Court of Appeal observed in the above quote, the court has unlimited jurisdiction to decide what is necessary to do justice between the parties except where legislators have provided specifically to the contrary.

The court's role under the CCAA is primarily supervisory and it makes determinations during the process where the parties are unable to agree, in order to facilitate the negotiation process. Thus the role is both procedural and substantive in making rights determinations within the context of an ongoing negotiation process. The court has held that because of the remedial nature of the legislation, the judiciary will exercise its jurisdiction to give effect to the public policy objectives of the statute where the express language is incomplete. The nature of insolvency is highly dynamic and the complexity of firm financial distress means that legal rules, no matter how codified, have not been fashioned to meet every contingency. Unlike rights-based litigation where the court is making determinations about rights and remedies for actions that have already occurred, many insolvency proceedings involve the court making determinations in the context of a dynamic, forward moving process that is seeking an outcome to the debtor's financial distress.

The exercise of a statutory authority requires the statute to be construed. The plain meaning or textualist approach has given way to a search for the object and goals of the statute and the intentionalist approach. This latter approach makes use of the purposive approach and the mischief rule, including its codification under interpretation statutes that every enactment is deemed remedial, and is to be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects. This latter approach advocates reading the statute as a whole and being mindful of Driedger's "one principle", that the words of the Act are to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. It is important that courts first interpret the statute before them and exercise their authority pursuant to the statute, before reaching for other tools in the judicial toolbox. Statutory interpretation using the principles articulated above leaves room for gap-filling in the common law provinces and a consideration of purpose in *Quebec* as a manifestation of the judge's overall task of statutory interpretation. Finally, the jurisprudence in relation to statutory interpretation demonstrates the fluidity inherent in the judge's task in seeking the objects of the statute and the intention of the legislature.

101 I accept the hierarchy suggested by the authors, namely statutory interpretation (which in the case of the CCAA has inherent in it "gap filling"), judicial discretion and thirdly inherent jurisdiction.

102 It simply does not make either commercial, business or practical common sense to say a CCAA plan must inevitably fail because one creditor cannot sue another for a claim that is over and above entitlement in the security that is the subject of the restructuring, and which becomes significantly greater than the value of the security (in this case the Notes) that would be available in bankruptcy. In CCAA situations, factual context is everything. Here, if the moving parties are correct, some creditors would recover much more than others on their security.

103 There may well be many situations in which compromise of some tort claims as between creditors is not directly related to success of the Plan and therefore should not be released; that is not the case here.

104 I have been satisfied the Plan cannot succeed without the compromise. In my view, given the purpose of the statute and the fact that this Plan is accepted by all appearing parties in principle, it is a reasonable gap-filling function to compromise certain claims necessary to complete restructuring by the parties. Those contributing to the Plan are directly related to the value of the notes themselves within the Plan.

105 I adopt the authors' conclusion at p. 94:

On the authors' reading of the commercial jurisprudence, the problem most often for the court to resolve is that the legislation in question is under-inclusive. It is not ambiguous. It simply does not address the application that is before the court, or in some cases, grants the court the authority to make any order it thinks fit. While there can be no magic formula to address this recurring situation, and indeed no one answer, it appears to the authors that practitioners have available a

number of tools to accomplish the same end. In determining the right tool, it may be best to consider the judicial task as if in a hierarchy of judicial tools that may be deployed. The first is examination of the statute, commencing with consideration of the precise wording, the legislative history, the object and purposes of the Act, perhaps a consideration of Driedger's principle of reading the words of the Act in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament, and a consideration of the gap-filling power, where applicable. It may very well be that this exercise will reveal that a broad interpretation of the legislation confers the authority on the court to grant the application before it. Only after exhausting this statutory interpretive function should the court consider whether it is appropriate to assert an inherent jurisdiction. Hence, inherent jurisdiction continues to be a valuable tool, but not one that is necessary to utilize in most circumstances.

Fraud Claims

106 I have concluded that claims of fraud do fall into a category distinct from negligence. The concern expressed by the Court in the endorsement of May 16, 2008 resulted in an amendment to the Plan by those supporting it. The Applicants amended the release provisions of the Plan to in effect "carve out" some fraud claims.

107 The concern expressed by those parties opposed to the Plan -- that the fraud exemption from the release was not sufficiently broad -- resulted in a further hearing on the issue on June 3, 2008. Those opposed continue to object to the amended release provisions.

108 The definition of fraud in a corporate context in the common law of Canada starts with the proposition that it must be made (1) knowingly; (2) without belief in its truth; (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.²¹ It is my understanding that while expressed somewhat differently, the above-noted ingredients form the basis of fraud claims in the civil law of Quebec, although there are differences.

109 The more serious nature of a civil fraud allegation, as opposed to a negligence allegation, has an effect on the degree of probability required for the plaintiff to succeed. In *Continental Insurance Co. v. Dalton Cartage Co.*²², Laskin J. wrote:

There is necessarily a matter of judgment involved in weighing evidence that goes to the burden of proof, and a trial judge is justified in scrutinizing evidence with greater care if there are serious allegations to be established by the proof that is offered. I put the matter in the words used by Lord Denning in *Bater v. Bater*, *supra*, at p. 459, as follows:

It is true that by our law there is a higher standard of proof in criminal cases than in civil cases, but this is subject to the qualification that there is no absolute standard in either case. In criminal cases the charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but there may be degrees of proof within that standard. Many great judges have said that, in proportion as the crime is enormous, so ought the proof to be clear. So also in civil cases. The case may be proved by a preponderance of probability, but there may be de-

degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject-matter. A civil court, when considering a charge of fraud, will naturally require a higher degree of probability than that which it would require if considering whether negligence were established. It does not adopt so high a degree as a criminal court, even when it is considering a charge of a criminal nature, but still it does require a degree of probability which is commensurate with the occasion.

I do not regard such an approach as a departure from a standard of proof based on a balance of probabilities nor as supporting a shifting standard. The question in all civil cases is what evidence with what weight that is accorded to it will move the court to conclude that proof on a balance of probabilities has been established.

110 The distinction between civil fraud and negligence was further explained by Finch J.A. in *Kripps v. Touche Ross & Co.*:²³

[101] Whether a representation was made negligently or fraudulently, reliance upon that representation is an issue of fact as to the representee's state of mind. There are cases where the representee may be able to give direct evidence as to what, in fact, induced him to act as he did. Where such evidence is available, its weight is a question for the trier of fact. In many cases however, as the authorities point out, it would be reasonable to expect such evidence to be given, and if it were it might well be suspect as self-serving. This is such a case.

[102] The distinction between cases of negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation is that proof of a dishonest or fraudulent frame of mind on the defendant's part is required in actions of deceit. That, too, is an issue of fact and one which may also, of necessity, fall to be resolved by way of inference. There is, however, nothing in that which touches on the issue of the plaintiff's reliance. I can see no reason why the burden of proving reliance by the plaintiff, and the drawing of inferences with respect to the plaintiff's state of mind, should be any different in cases of negligent misrepresentation than it is in cases of fraud.

111 In *Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Leigh Instruments Ltd. (Trustee of)*²⁴, Winkler J. (as he then was) reviewed the leading common law cases:

[477] Fraud is the most serious civil tort which can be alleged, and must be both strictly pleaded and strictly proved. The main distinction be-

tween the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation has been touched upon above, namely the dishonest state of mind of the representor. The state of mind was described in the seminal case *Derry v. Peek* (1889), 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L.) which held fraud is proved where it is shown that a false representation has been made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, without caring whether it is true or false. The intention to deceive, or reckless disregard for the truth is critical.

[478] Where fraudulent misrepresentation is alleged against a corporation, the intention to deceive must still be strictly proved. Further, in order to attach liability to a corporation for fraud, the fraudulent intent must have been held by an individual person who is either a directing mind of the corporation, or who is acting in the course of their employment through the principle of *respondeat superior* or vicarious liability. In *B.G. Checo v. B.C. Hydro* (1990), 4 C.C.L.T. (2d) 161 at 223 (Aff'd, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 12), Hinkson J.A., writing for the majority, traced the jurisprudence on corporate responsibility in the context of a claim in fraudulent misrepresentation at 222-223:

Subsequently, in *H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. v. T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd.*, [1957] 1 Q.B. 159, [1956] 3 All E.R. 624 (C.A.), Denning L.J. said at p. 172:

A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as such. So you will find that in cases where the law requires personal fault as a condition of liability in tort, the fault of the manager will be the personal fault of the company. That is made clear by Lord Haldane's speech in *Leonard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.*

It is apparent that the law in Canada dealing with the responsibility of a corporation for the tort of deceit is still evolving. In view of the English decisions and the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the *Dredging* case, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, *supra*, it would appear

that the concept of vicarious responsibility based upon *respondeat superior* is too narrow a basis to determine the liability of a corporation. The structure and operations of corporations are becoming more complex. However, the fundamental proposition that the plaintiff must establish an intention to deceive on the part of the defendant still applies.

See also: *Standard Investments Ltd. et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce* (1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 473 (C.A.) (Leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada refused Feb. 3, 1986, [1986] S.C.C.A. No. 29).

[479] In the case of fraudulent misrepresentation, there are circumstances where silence may attract liability. If a material fact which was true at the time a contract was executed becomes false while the contract remains executory, or if a statement believed to be true at the time it was made is discovered to be false, then the representor has a duty to disclose the change in circumstances. The failure to do so may amount to a fraudulent misrepresentation. See: P. Perell, "False Statements" (1996), 18 *Advocates' Quarterly* 232 at 242.

[480] In *Rainbow Industrial Caterers Ltd. v. Canadian National Railway Co.* (1988), 54 D.L.R. (4th) 43 (B.C.C.A.) (Aff'd on other grounds [1991] 3 S.C.R. 3), the British Columbia Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge's finding of fraud through non-disclosure on the basis that the defendant did not remain silent as to the changed fact but was simply slow to respond to the change and could only be criticized for its "communications arrangements." In so doing, the court adopted the approach to fraud through silence established by the House of Lords in *Brownlie v. Campbell*, (1880), 5 App. Cas. 925 at 950. Esson J.A. stated at 67-68:

There is much emphasis in the plaintiffs submissions and in the reasons of the trial judge on the circumstance that this is not a case of fraud "of the usual kind" involving positive representations of fact but is, rather, one concerned only with non-disclosure by a party which has become aware of an altered set of circumstances. It is, I think, potentially misleading to regard these as different categories of fraud rather than as a different factual basis for a finding of fraud. Where the fraud is alleged to arise from failure to disclose, the plaintiff remains subject to all of the stringent requirements which the law imposes upon those who allege fraud. The authority relied upon

by the trial judge was the speech of Lord Blackburn in *Brownlie v. Campbell*. ... The trial judge quoted this excerpt:

... when a statement or representation has been made in the bona fide belief that it is true, and the party who has made it afterwards comes to find out that it is untrue, and discovers what he should have said, he can no longer honestly keep up that silence on the subject after that has come to his knowledge, thereby allowing the other party to go on, and still more, inducing him to go on, upon a statement which was honestly made at the time at which it was made, but which he has not now retracted when he has become aware that it can be no longer honestly perservered [sic] in.

The relationship between the two bases for fraud appears clearly enough if one reads that passage in the context of the passage which immediately precedes it:

I quite agree in this, that whenever a man in order to induce a contract says that which is in his knowledge untrue with the intention to mislead the other side, and induce them to enter into the contract, that is downright fraud; in plain English, and Scotch also, it is a downright lie told to induce the other party to act upon it, and it should of course be treated as such. I further agree in this: that when a statement or representation ...

[481] Fraud through "active non-disclosure" was considered by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in *Abel v. McDonald*, [1964] 2 O.R. 256 (C.A.) in which the court held at 259: "By active non-disclosure is meant that the defendants, with knowledge that the damage to the premises had occurred actively prevented as far as they could that knowledge from coming to the notice of the appellants."

112 I agree with the comment of Winkler J. in *Toronto Dominion Bank v. Leigh Instruments, supra*, that the law in Canada for corporate responsibility for the tort of deceit is evolving. Hence the concern expressed by counsel for Asset Providers that a finding as a result of fraud (an intentional tort) could give rise to claims under the *Negligence Act* to extend to all who may be said to have contributed to the "fault."²⁵

113 I understand the reasoning of the Plan supporters for drawing the fraud "carve out" in a narrow fashion. It is to avoid the potential cascade of litigation that they fear would result if a broader "carve out" were to be allowed. Those opposed urged that quite simply to allow the restrictive fraud claim only would be to deprive them of a right at law.

114 The fraud issue was put in simplistic terms during the oral argument on June 3, 2008. Those parties who oppose the restrictions in the amended Release to deal with only some claims of fraud, argue that the amendments are merely cosmetic and are meaningless and would operate to insulate many individuals and corporations who may have committed fraud.

115 Mr. Woods, whose clients include some corporations resident in Quebec, submitted that the "carve out," as it has been called, falls short of what would be allowable under the civil law of Quebec as claims of fraud. In addition, he pointed out that under Quebec law, security for costs on a full indemnity basis would not be permitted.

116 I accept the submission of Mr. Woods that while there is similarity, there is no precise equivalence between the civil law of Quebec and the common law of Ontario and other provinces as applied to fraud.

117 Indeed, counsel for other opposing parties complain that the fraud carve out is unduly restrictive of claims of fraud that lie at common law, which their clients should be permitted in fairness to pursue.

118 The particular carve out concern, which is applicable to both the civil and common law jurisdictions, would limit causes of actions to authorized representatives of ABCP dealers. "ABCP dealers" is a defined term within the Plan. Those actions would proceed in the home province of the plaintiffs.

119 The thrust of the Plan opponents' arguments is that as drafted, the permitted fraud claims would preclude recovery in circumstances where senior bank officers who had the requisite fraudulent intent directed sales persons to make statements that the sales persons reasonably believed but that the senior officers knew to be false.

120 That may well be the result of the effect of the Releases as drafted. Assuming that to be the case, I am not satisfied that the Plan should be rejected on the basis that the release covenant for fraud is not as broad as it could be.

121 The Applicants and supporters have responded to the Court's concern that as initially drafted, the initial release provisions would have compromised all fraud claims. I was aware when the further request for release consideration was made that any "carve out" would unlikely be sufficiently broad to include any possibility of all deceit or fraud claims being made in the future.

122 The particular concern was to allow for those claims that might arise from knowingly false representations being made directly to Noteholders, who relied on the fraudulent misrepresentation and suffered damage as a result.

123 The Release as drafted accomplishes that purpose. It does not go as far as to permit all possible fraud claims. I accept the position of the Applicants and supporters that as drafted, the Releases are in the circumstances of this Plan fair and reasonable. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons:

1. I am satisfied that the Applicants and supporters will not bring forward a Plan that is as broad in permitting fraud claims as those opposing urge should be permitted.
2. None of the Plan opponents have brought forward particulars of claims against persons or parties that would fall outside those envisaged within

the carve out. Without at least some particulars, expanded fraud claims can only be regarded as hypothetical or speculative.

3. I understand and accept the position of the Plan supporters that to broaden fraud claim relief does risk extensive complex litigation, the prevention of which is at the heart of the Plan. The likelihood of expanded claims against many parties is most likely if the fraud issue were open-ended.
4. Those who wish to claim fraud within the Plan can do so in addition to the remedies on the Notes that are available to them and to all other Noteholders. In other words, those Noteholders claiming fraud also obtain the other Plan benefits.

124 Mr. Sternberg on behalf of Hy Bloom did refer to the claims of his clients particularized in the Claim commenced in the Superior Court of Quebec. The Claim particularizes statements attributed to various National Bank representatives both before and after the August 2007 freeze of the Notes. Mr. Sternberg asked rhetorically how could the Court countenance the compromise of what in the future might be found to be fraud perpetrated at the highest levels of the Canadian and foreign banks.

125 The response to Mr. Sternberg and others is that for the moment, what is at issue is a liquidity crisis that affects the ABCP market in Canada. The Applicants and supporters have brought forward a Plan to alleviate and attempt to fix that liquidity crisis.

126 The Plan does in my view represent a reasonable balance between benefit to all Noteholders and enhanced recovery for those who can make out specific claims in fraud.

127 I leave to others the questions of all the underlying causes of the liquidity crisis that prompted the Note freeze in August 2007. If by some chance there is an organized fraudulent scheme, I leave it to others to deal with. At the moment, the Plan as proposed represents the best contract for recovery for the vast majority of Noteholders and hopefully restoration of the ABCP market in Canada.

Hardship

128 As to the hardship issue, the Court was apprised in the course of submissions that the Plan was said by some to act unfairly in respect of certain Noteholders, in particular those who hold Ironstone Series B notes. It was submitted that unlike other trusts for which underlying assets will be pooled to spread risk, the underlying assets of Ironstone Trust are being "siloeed" and will bear the same risk as they currently bear.

129 Unfortunately, this will be the case but the result is not due to any particular directive purpose of the Plan itself, but rather because the assets that underlie the trust have been determined to be totally "Ineligible Assets," which apparently have exposure to the U.S. residential sub-prime mortgage market.

130 I have concluded that within the context of the Plan as a whole it does not unfairly treat the Ironstone Noteholders (although their replacement notes may not be worth as much as others'.) The Ironstone Noteholders have still voted by a wide majority in favour of the Plan.

131 Since the Initial Order of March 17, there have been a number of developments (settlements) by parties outside the Plan itself of which the Court was not fully apprised until recently,

which were intended to address the issue of hardship to certain investors. These efforts are summarized in paragraphs 10 to 33 of the Eighth Report of the Monitor.

132 I have reviewed the efforts made by various parties supporting the Plan to deal with hardship issues. I am satisfied that they represent a fair and reasonable attempt to deal with issues that result in differential impact among Noteholders. The pleas of certain Noteholders to have their individual concerns addressed have through the Monitor been passed on to those necessary for a response.

133 Counsel for one affected Noteholder, the Avrith family, which opposes the Plan, drew the Court's attention to their particular plight. In response, counsel for National Bank noted the steps it had taken to provide at least some hardship redress.

134 No Plan of this size and complexity could be expected to satisfy all affected by it. The size of the majority who have approved it is testament to its overall fairness. No plan to address a crisis of this magnitude can work perfect equity among all stakeholders.

135 The information available satisfies me that business judgment by a number of supporting parties has been applied to deal with a number of inequities. The Plan cannot provide complete redress to all Noteholders. The parties have addressed the concerns raised. In my view, the Court can ask nothing more.

Conclusion

136 I noted in the endorsement of May 16, 2008 my acceptance and understanding of why the Plan Applicants and sponsors required comprehensive releases of negligence. I was and am satisfied that there would be the third and fourth claims they anticipated if the Plan fails. If negligence claims were not released, any Noteholder who believed that there was value to a tort claim would be entitled to pursue the same. There is no way to anticipate the impact on those who support the Plan. As a result, I accept the Applicants' position that the Plan would be withdrawn if this were to occur.

137 The CCAA has now been accepted as a statute that allows for judicial flexibility to enable business people by the exercise of majority vote to restructure insolvent entities.

138 It would defeat the purpose of the statute if a single creditor could hold a restructuring Plan hostage by insisting on the ability to sue another creditor whose participation in and contribution to the restructuring was essential to its success. Tyranny by a minority to defeat an otherwise fair and reasonable plan is contrary to the spirit of the CCAA.

139 One can only speculate on what response might be made by any one of the significant corporations that are moving parties and now oppose confirmation of this Plan, if any of those entities were undergoing restructuring and had their Plans in jeopardy because a single creditor sought to sue a financing creditor, which required a release as part of its participation.

140 There are a variety of underlying causes for the liquidity crisis that has given rise to this restructuring.

141 The following quotation from the May 23, 2008 issue of The Economist magazine succinctly describes the problem:

If the crisis were simply about the creditworthiness of underlying assets, that question would be simpler to answer. The problem has been as much about con-

fidence as about money. Modern financial systems contain a mass of amplifiers that multiply the impact of both losses and gains, creating huge uncertainty.

142 The above quote is not directly about the ABCP market in Canada, but about the potential crisis to the worldwide banking system at this time. In my view it is applicable to the ABCP situation at this time. Apart from the Plan itself, there is a need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada and this Plan is a legitimate use of the CCAA to accomplish that goal.

143 I have as a result addressed a number of questions in order to be satisfied that in the specific context of this case, a Plan that includes third party releases is justified within CCAA jurisdiction. I have concluded that all of the following questions can be answered in the affirmative.

1. Are the parties to be released necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor?
2. Are the claims to be released rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it?
3. Can the Court be satisfied that without the releases the Plan cannot succeed?
4. Are the parties who will have claims against them released contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan?
5. Is the Plan one that will benefit not only the debtor but creditor Noteholders generally?
6. Have the voting creditors approved the Plan with knowledge of the nature and effect of the releases?
7. Is the Court satisfied that in the circumstances the releases are fair and reasonable in the sense that they are not overly broad and not offensive to public policy?

144 I have concluded on the facts of this Application that the releases sought as part of the Plan, including the language exempting fraud, to be permissible under the CCAA and are fair and reasonable.

145 The motion to approve the Plan of Arrangement sought by the Application is hereby granted on the terms of the draft Order filed and signed.

146 One of the unfortunate aspects of CCAA real time litigation is that it produces a tension between well-represented parties who would not be present if time were not of the essence.

147 Counsel for some of those opposing the Plan complain that they were not consulted by Plan supporters to "negotiate" the release terms. On the other side, Plan supporters note that with the exception of general assertions in the action on behalf of Hy Bloom (who claims negligence as well), there is no articulation by those opposing of against whom claims would be made and the particulars of those claims.

148 It was submitted on behalf of one Plan opponent that the limitation provisions are unduly restrictive and should extend to at least two years from the date a potential plaintiff becomes aware of an Expected Claim.

149 The open-ended claim potential is rejected by the Plan supporters on the basis that what is needed now, since Notes have been frozen for almost one year, is certainty of claims and that those who allege fraud surely have had plenty of opportunity to know the basis of their evidence.

150 Other opponents seek to continue a negotiation with Plan supporters to achieve a resolution with respect to releases satisfactory to each opponent.

151 I recognize that the time for negotiation has been short. The opponents' main opposition to the Plan has been the elimination of negligence claims and the Court has been advised that an appeal on that issue will proceed.

152 I can appreciate the desire for opponents to negotiate for any advantage possible. I can also understand the limitation on the patience of the variety of parties who are Plan supporters, to get on with the Plan or abandon it.

153 I am satisfied that the Plan supporters have listened to some of the concerns of the opponents and have incorporated those concerns to the extent they are willing in the revised release form. I agreed that it is time to move on.

154 I wish to thank all counsel for their cooperation and assistance. There would be no Plan except for the sustained and significant effort of Mr. Crawford and the committee he chairs.

155 This is indeed hopefully a unique situation in which it is necessary to look at larger issues than those affecting those who feel strongly that personal redress should predominate.

156 If I am correct, the CCAA is indeed a vehicle that can adequately balance the issues of all those concerned.

157 The Plan is a business proposal and that includes the releases. The Plan has received overwhelming creditor support. I have concluded that the releases that are part of the Plan are fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.

158 The form of Order that was circulated to the Service List for comment will issue as signed with the release of this decision.

C.L. CAMPBELL J.

* * * * *

SCHEDULE "A"

CONDUITS

Apollo Trust

Apsley Trust

Aria Trust

Aurora Trust

Comet Trust

Encore Trust

Gemini Trust

Ironstone Trust

MMAI-I Trust
Newshore Canadian Trust
Opus Trust
Planet Trust
Rocket Trust
Selkirk Funding Trust
Silverstone Trust
Slate Trust
Structured Asset Trust
Structured Investment Trust III
Symphony Trust
Whitehall Trust

* * * * *

SCHEDULE "B"

APPLICANTS

ATB Financial
Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec
Canaccord Capital Corporation
Canada Post Corporation
Credit Union Central of Alberta Limited
Credit Union Central of British Columbia
Credit Union Central of Canada
Credit Union Central of Ontario
Credit Union Central of Saskatchewan
Desjardins Group
Magna International Inc.
National Bank Financial Inc./National Bank of Canada
NAV Canada
Northwater Capital Management Inc.
Public Sector Pension Investment Board
The Governors of the University of Alberta

* * * * *

APPENDIX 1
PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL

Counsel	Party Represented
Benjamin Zarnett Fred Myers Brian Empey	Applicants: Pan-Canadian Investors Committee for Third-Party Structured Asset-Backed Commercial Paper
Donald Milner Graham Phoenix Xeno C. Martis David Lemieux Robert Girard	Respondents: Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp.
Aubrey Kauffman Stuart Brotman	Respondents: 4446372 Canada Inc. and 6932819 Canada Inc., as Issuer Trustees
Craig J. Hill Sam P. Rappos Marc Duchesne	Monitor: Ernst & Young Inc.
Jeffrey Carhart Joseph Marin Jay Hoffman	Ad Hoc Committee and PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., in its capacity as Financial Advisor
Arthur O. Jacques Thomas McRae	Ad Hoc Retail Creditors Committee (Brian Hunter, et al.)
Henry Juroviesky Eliezer Karp	Ad Hoc Retail Creditors Committee (Brian Hunter, et al.)
Jay A. Swartz Nathasha MacParland	Administrator of Aria Trust, Encore Trust, Newshore Canadian Trust and Symphony Trust
James A. Woods Mathieu	Air Transat A.T. Inc., Transat Tours Canada Inc., The

Giguere Sébastien Richemont Marie-Anne Paquette	Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., Aéroports de Montreal Inc., Aéroports de Montréal Capital Inc., Pomerleau Ontario Inc., Pomerleau Inc., Labopharm Inc., L'Agence Métropolitaine de Transport (AMT), Domtar Inc., Domtar Pulp and Paper Products Inc., Giro Inc., Vêtements de sports RGR Inc., 131519 Canada Inc., Tecsys Inc., New Gold Inc., Services Hypothécaires La Patrimoniale Inc. and Jazz Air LLP
Peter F.C. Howard Samaneh Hosseini William Scott	Asset Providers/Liquidity Suppliers: Bank of America, N.A.; Citibank, N.A.; Citibank Canada, in its capacity as Credit Derivative Swap Counterparty and not in any other capacity; Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC Bank Canada; HSBC Bank USA, National Association; Merrill Lynch International; Merrill Lynch Capital Services Inc.; Swiss Re Financial Products Corporation; and UBS AG
George S. Glezos Lisa C. Munro	Becmar Investments Ltd, Dadrex Holdings Inc. and JTI-Macdonald Corp.
Jeremy E. Dacks	Blackrock Financial Management, Inc.
Virginie Gauthier Mario Forte	Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec
Kevin P. McElcheran Mal- colm M. Mercer Geoff R. Hall	Canadian Banks: Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada, The Bank of Nova Scotia and The Toronto-Dominion Bank
Harvey Chaiton	Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
S. Richard Orzy Jeffrey S. Leon	CIBC Mellon Trust Company, Computershare Trust Company of Canada and BNY Trust Company of Can-

ada, as Indenture Trustees

Margaret L. Waddell

Cinar Corporation, Cinar Productions (2004) and Cookie Jar Animation Inc., ADR Capital Inc. and GMAC Leaseco Corporation

Robin B. Schwill James Rumball

Coventree Capital Inc. and Nereus Financial Inc.

J. Thomas Curry
Usman M. Sheikh

Coventree Capital Inc.

Kenneth Kraft

DBRS Limited

David E. Baird, Q.C.
Edmond Lamek
Ian D. Collins

Desjardins Group

Allan Sternberg Sam R. Sasso

Hy Bloom Inc. and Cardacian Mortgages Services Inc.

Catherine Francis
Phillip Bevans

Individual Noteholder

Howard Shapray, Q.C.
Stephen Fitterman

Ivanhoe Mines Inc.

Kenneth T. Rosenberg Lily Harmer Massimo Starnino

Jura Energy Corporation, Redcorp Ventures Ltd. and as agent to Ivanhoe Mines Inc.

Joel Vale

I. Mucher Family

John Salmas	Natcan Trust Company, as Note Indenture Trustee
John B. Laskin Scott Bomhof	National Bank Financial Inc. and National Bank of Canada
Robin D. Walker Clifton Prophet Junior Sirivar	NAV Canada
Timothy Pinos	Northern Orion Canada Pampas Ltd.
Murray E. Stieber	Paquette & Associés Huissiers en Justice, s.e.n.c. and André Perron
Susan Grundy	Public Sector Pension Investment Board
Dan Dowdall	Royal Bank of Canada
Thomas N.T. Sutton	Securitus Capital Corp.
Daniel V. MacDonald Andrew Kent	The Bank of Nova Scotia
James H. Grout	The Goldfarb Corporation
Tamara Brooks	The Investment Dealers Association of Canada and the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada

Sam R. Sasso Travelers Transportation Services Inc.

Scott A. Turner WebTech Wireless Inc. and Wynn Capital Corporation Inc.

Peter T. Linder, Q.C. Edward H. Halt, Q.C. West Energy Ltd., Petrolifera Petroleum Ltd., Vaquero Resources Ltd., UTS Energy Corporation, Nexstar Energy Ltd., Sabre Tooth Energy Ltd., Sabre Energy Ltd., Alliance Pipeline Ltd., Standard Energy Inc. and Power Play Resources Limited

Steven L. Graff Woods LLP

Gordon Capern Megan E. Shortreed Xceed Mortgage Corporation

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APPENDIX 2

TERMS

"ABCP Conduits" means, collectively, the trusts that are subject to the Plan, namely the following: Apollo Trust, Apsley Trust, Aria Trust, Aurora Trust, Comet Trust, Encore Trust, Gemini Trust, Ironstone Trust, MMAI-I Trust, Newshore Canadian Trust, Opus Trust, Planet Trust, Rocket Trust, SAT, Selkirk Funding Trust, Silverstone Trust, SIT III, Slate Trust, Symphony Trust and Whitehall Trust, and their respective satellite trusts, where applicable.

"ABCP Sponsors" means, collectively, the Sponsors of the ABCP Conduits (and, where applicable, such Sponsors' affiliates) that have issued the Affected ABCP, namely, Coventree Capital Inc., Quanto Financial Corporation, National Bank Financial Inc., Nereus Financial Inc., Newshore Financial Services Inc. and Securitus Capital Corp.

"Ad Hoc Committee" means those Noteholders, represented by the law firm of Miller Thomson LLP, who sought funding from the Investors Committee to retain Miller Thomson and PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., to assist it in starting to form a view on the restructuring. The Investors Committee agreed to fund up to \$1 million in fees and facilitated the entering into of confidentiality agreements among Miller Thomson, PwC, the Asset Providers, the Sponsors, JPMorgan and E&Y so that Miller Thomson and PwC could carry out their mandate. Chairman Crawford met with representatives of Miller Thomson and PwC, and the Committee's advisors answered questions and discussed the proposed restructuring with them.

"Applicants" means, collectively, the 17 member institutions of the Investors Committee in their respective capacities as Noteholders.

"CCAA Parties" means, collectively, the Issuer Trustees in respect of the Affected ABCP, namely 4446372 Canada Inc., 6932819 Canada Inc., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp. and the ABCP Conduits.

"Conduit" means a special purpose entity, typically in the form of a trust, used in an ABCP program that purchases assets and funds these purchases either through term securitizations or through the issuance of commercial paper.

"Issuer Trustees" means, collectively, the issuer trustees of each of the ABCP Conduits, namely, 4446372 Canada Inc., 6932819 Canada Inc., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp. and Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp. and **"Issuer Trustee"** means any one of them. The Issuer Trustees, together with the ABCP Conduits, are sometimes referred to, collectively, as the **"CCAA Parties"**.

"Liquidity Provider" means like asset providers, dealer banks, commercial banks and other entities often the same as the asset providers who provide liquidity to ABCP, or a party that agreed to provide liquidity funding upon the terms and subject to the conditions of a liquidity agreement in respect of an ABCP program. The Liquidity Providers in respect of the Affected ABCP include, without limitation: ABN AMRO Bank N.V., Canada Branch; Bank of America N.A., Canada Branch; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce; Citibank Canada; Citibank, N.A.; Danske Bank A/S; Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC Bank Canada; HSBC Bank USA National Association; Merrill Lynch Capital Services, Inc.; Merrill Lynch International; Royal Bank of Canada; Swiss Re Financial Products Corporation; The Bank of Nova Scotia; The Royal Bank of Scotland plc and UBS AG.

"Noteholder" means a holder of Affected ABCP.

"Sponsors" means, generally, the entities that initiate the establishment of an ABCP program in respect of a Conduit. Sponsors are effectively management companies for the ABCP program that arrange deals with Asset Providers and capture the excess spread on these transactions. The Sponsor approves the terms of an ABCP program and serves as administrative agent and/or financial services (or securitization) agent for the ABCP program directly or through its affiliates.

"Traditional Assets" means those assets held by the ABCP Conduits in non-synthetic securitization structures such as trade receivables, credit card receivables, RMBS and CMBS and investments in CDOs entered into by third-parties.

* * * * *

APPENDIX 3

[Editor's note: Appendix 3 was not attached to the copy received from the Court and therefore is not included in the judgment.]

cp/e/ln/qlkxl/qlklb/qlbdp/qltxp/qlesm/qlbrl/qlcas/qlhcs/qlisl

1 Information Statement, p. 18.

2 Information Statement, p. 18.

3 *Canadian Airlines Corp. (Re)*, [2000] A.J. No. 771, 2000 ABQB 442, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 265 A.R. 201, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 98 A.C.W.S. (3d) 334.

4 *Olympia and York Dev. Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

5 *Canadian Red Cross Society (Re)*, [1998] O.J. No. 3306, 72 O.T.C. 99, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 81 A.C.W.S. (3d) 932.

6 *Muscletech Research and Development Inc. (Re)*, [2006] O.J. No. 4087, 25 C.B.R. (5th) 231, 152 A.C.W.S. (3d) 16, 2006 CarswellOnt 6230.

7 *Muscletech Research and Development Inc. (Re)*, [2007] O.J. No. 695, 30 C.B.R. (5th) 59, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 22, 2007 CarswellOnt 1029.

8 *Vicwest Corp. (Re)*, [2003] O.J. No. 3772 per Pepall J. at paragraph 23.

9 The Court was provided with copies of 12 Plan approvals under the CCAA in which releases were granted. In various instances these included officers, directors and creditors. The moving parties note that no objection to the nature or extent of release was taken.

10 *NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc.*, [1999] O.J. No. 4749, 46 O.R. (3d) 514, 181 D.L.R. (4th) 37, 127 O.A.C. 338, 1 B.L.R. (3d) 1, 15 C.B.R. (4th) 67, 47 C.C.L.T. (2d) 213, 93 A.C.W.S. (3d) 391.

11 *Stelco Inc. (Re)*, [2005] O.J. No. 4814, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297, 143 A.C.W.S. (3d) 623, 2005 CarswellOnt 6483.

12 *Stelco Inc. (Re)*, [2005] O.J. No. 4883.

13 *Stelco Inc. (Re)*, [2007] O.J. No. 2533, 2007 ONCA 483, 226 O.A.C. 72, 32 B.L.R. (4th) 77, 35 C.B.R. (5th) 174, 158 A.C.W.S. (3d) 877, 2007 CarswellOnt 4108.

14 *Muscletech Research and Development Inc. (Re)*, [2007] O.J. No. 695, 30 C.B.R. (5th) 59, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 22, 2007 CarswellOnt 1029.

15 *Michaud v. Steinberg Inc.* 1993 CanLII 3991 (Q.C. C.A.).

16 Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2007 Thomson, Carswell. Janis Sarra edition.

17 Ibid, p. 42.

18 Ibid, pp. 44-45.

19 Ibid, p. 45.

20 Ibid pp. 49-51.

21 *Derry v. Peek*, (1889) 14 A.C. App. Cas., 337 (H.L.).

22 *Continental Insurance Co. v. Dalton Cartage Co.*, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 164, 131 D.L.R. (3d) 559.

23 *Kripps v. Touche Ross & Co.*, [1997] 6 W.W.R. 421, 89 B.C.A.C. 288.

24 *Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Leigh Instruments Ltd. (Trustee of)* (1998), 40 B.L.R. (2d) 1, 63 O.T.C. 1. (S.C.J.).

25 See *Ecolab Ltd. v. Greenpeace Services Ltd.*, [1996] O.J. No. 3528 per Ground J.

TAB 2

Indexed as:
**Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of
Canada (B.C.C.A.)**

Between
**Northland Properties Limited, Sandman Inns Ltd., Sandman Four
Ltd., Unity Investment Company, Limited, B & W Development Co.
(1986) Ltd., T N Developments Ltd., Petitioners, (Respondents),
and**
**Excelsior Life Insurance Company of Canada, Respondents,
(Appellants), and**
Guardian Insurance Co. of Canada, Respondents, (Appellants)

[1989] B.C.J. No. 63

[1989] 3 W.W.R. 363

34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122

73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195

13 A.C.W.S. (3d) 303

Vancouver Registry: CA010238, CA010198 and CA010271

British Columbia Court of Appeal

McEachern C.J.B.C., Esson and Wallace JJ.A.

January 5, 1989

Company Act -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

The guardian had a first mortgage on a building owned by Unity which was the only asset of Unity. Unity is one of a number of companies that successfully petitioned under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act for an order consolidating all the companies. Per McEachern CJBC: There would be considerable merit for the submission that there is no jurisdiction under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to entertain a consolidation proposal except for the fact that the applications were made not just under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, but also under ss. 276-278 of the B.C. Company Act. Section 20 of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act provides that: "The provisions of this Act may be applied conjointly with the provisions of any Act...of any province...". Therefore there is jurisdiction to entertain a consolidation proposal. To hold otherwise would mean that it would be necessary to propose separate plans for each company and those plans might become seriously fragmented. [B.C. Recent Decisions, vol. 9, no. 11.]

Counsel for the Appellants Excelsior Life Insurance Company of Canada and National Life Assurance Company of Canada: Frederick H. Herbert and Nick Kambas.

Counsel for the Appellant Guardian: Alan P. Czepil.
Counsel for the Respondent Companies: H.C. Ritchie Clark and R.D. Ellis.
Counsel for the Respondent Bank of Montreal: G.W. Ghikas and C.S. Bird.

MCEACHERN C.J.B.C. (for the Court, orally, dismissing the appeal):-- We are giving an oral judgment this morning because of the commercial urgency of these appeals and because counsel's helpful arguments have narrowed the issues substantially. We are indebted to counsel for their useful submissions.

The Petitioners (Respondents on these appeals) are a number of companies (which I shall call "the companies") who have outstanding issues of secured bonds and are all engaged in real estate investment and development in Western North America and who collectively own and operate a number of office buildings and the Sandman Inn chain of hotels and motels. The appellants, Excelsior Life and National Life and Guardian Trust, are creditors of the Petitioners who hold mortgages over specific properties owned by certain of the Companies. They, along with eleven other lenders, are called "priority mortgagees".

The Companies ran into financial problems starting in 1981 and by spring of 1988, the Companies owed approximately \$200 million against assets of \$100 million. The major creditor, the Bank of Montreal (which I shall sometimes call the "Bank"), was owed approximately \$117 million by the Companies and the Bank authorized the commencement of a receivership action. The Bank holds security in all of the assets of the Companies by way of trust deeds and bonds ranking second in priority to the security held by the priority mortgagees. Before decision in the receivership proceedings, the companies petitioned under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act R.S.C. 1970, c. C-25 (which I shall sometimes refer to as "C.C.A.A.") for an order directing meetings of the secured and unsecured creditors to consider a proposed compromise or arrangement plan.

Mr. Justice Trainor, on April 7, 1988 granted the petition authorizing the companies to file a reorganization plan with the court, and that in the meantime, the Companies would continue to carry on business and remain in possession of their undertaking, property and assets. Further, all proceedings against the Companies were stayed. The original reorganization plan was filed on August 25, 1988. It provided that each priority mortgagee holding security over the property of the individual petitioners would constitute a separate class.

The Petitioners obtained an order to hold a creditors' meeting on October 31, 1988 and November 1, 1988. The order provided that in addition to meetings of individual classes of creditors, there should be a later general meeting of all creditors to consider the plan. In addition, the petitioners obtained an order to file and serve the amended plan seven days before the creditors' meeting along with their information circular. Other applications were brought which dealt with notices, proxies, proof of claim forms, exchange rates, and directions for the calling of meetings.

The amended plan was based on the following classes of creditors (descriptions of which are contained in the reasons for judgment of Trainor, J. at pp. 6-7) namely:

Shareholder Creditors

A Bond Holders

Put Debt Claimants and C Bond Holders

Priority Mortgagees

Government Creditors

Property Tax Creditors

General Creditors

The amended plan also proposed consolidation of all the petitioner companies. The amended plan provided that all priority mortgagees would be grouped into one class for voting purposes. There were fifteen priority mortgagees in total, eleven of which were fully secured while the remaining four (including the appellants) faced deficiencies. The amended plan also authorized the Companies to negotiate with creditors in order, if possible, to reach as much agreement as possible so that the plan would have a better chance of gaining the requisite majorities.

The companies and the Bank of Montreal reached a settlement agreement on October 20, 1988, dealing with (a) the amounts owing to the Bank by the Companies; (b) claims by the Companies and others against the Bank in relation to a lender liability lawsuit; and (c) the terms of a compromise between the Bank and the Companies. The Bank of Montreal, according to the Information circular, would only realize \$32,859,005 upon liquidation. The settlement agreement between the Bank of Montreal and the Companies, which is incorporated as part of the plan, provides that as of January 17, 1989, the Bank is to receive the sum of \$41,650,000 in either cash or in cash plus properties. A copy of this agreement was provided to creditors, along with such other documents including a notice of the meetings, the reorganization plan, and an extensive Information Circular.

The class meetings and the general meetings of creditors were held in Vancouver on October 31 and November 1, 1988. All classes of creditors voted unanimously in favour of the plan except the priority mortgagee class. This class approved the plan by the requisite majority pursuant to the provisions of the C.C.A.A., that is, a simple majority of creditors in the class holding at least 75% of the debt voting in favour of the plan. 73.3% of the priority mortgagees holding 78.35% of the debt voted in favour of the plan.

Relax Development Corporation Ltd., a priority mortgagee facing a deficiency, voted in favour of the plan. If Relax had not voted in favour of the plan, the Companies would not have obtained the requisite majority from the priority mortgagee class. Prior to the settlement with the Bank, Relax struck an agreement with the Companies on the value of its security amounting to about \$900,000 over an appraisal value which was in dispute. Relax agreed in the settlement to vote in favour of the plan. More about that later.

The appellants on these appeals voted against the plan, and raised objections that the plan improperly put all priority mortgagees into one class, and also that the plan preferred some creditors over others. They allege that the net effect of the plan on the fully secured priority mortgagees is different than that on the mortgagees facing deficiencies, in that the plan reduces the amount of debt owed to the mortgagees facing deficiencies to the market value of the subject property of their respective security, and required assignment of the deficiency for \$1.00. They lose the right to obtain an order absolute of foreclosure pursuant to their security. On the other hand, the fully secured priority mortgagees recover the entire amount of their indebtedness.

The appellants Excelsior and National are secured creditors of the petitioner, Northland Properties Ltd., one of the Companies. They hold a first mortgage jointly over an office tower in Calgary adjacent to the Calgary Sandman Inn. Both buildings share common facilities. The principle amount of the debt

owing to Excelsior and National as of October 26, 1988, is \$15,874,533 plus interest of \$311,901. The market value of the office tower as of May 13, 1988, was stated to be \$11,675,000. They, therefore, face a potential deficiency of \$4,512,434.

Guardian Trust is a secured creditor of the petitioner, Unity Investment Company Limited, and holds a first mortgage over a small office building in Nelson, B.C. The amount owing to Guardian is \$409,198.46 and the estimated deficiency is approximately \$150,000 exclusive of transaction costs.

Mr. Justice Trainor, on December 12, 1988, found that the Companies had complied with the provisions of the C.C.A.A., and, therefore, the court could exercise its discretion and sanction the reorganization plan. Excelsior and National and Guardian appeal against that decision.

Mr. Justice Trainor had the carriage of this matter almost from the beginning and he heard several preliminary applications. In a careful and thorough judgment, he set out the facts distinctly, reviewed the authorities and approved the plan. I do not propose to review the authorities again because they are extensively quoted in nearly every judgment on this subject. It will be sufficient to say that they include *Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney General of Quebec* [1943] S.C.R. 659; *Meredian Investments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* (1984), 52 C.B.R. 109; *Re Associated Investments of Canada* [1988] 2 W.W.R. 211; *Re Alabama. New Orleans and Pacific Junction Railway Company* [1891] 1 Ch. 213; *Re Dairy Corporation of Canada Ltd.*, [1934] O.R. 436; *Re Wellington Building Corporation Limited* (1934), 16 C.B.R. 48; *British American Nickel Corporation Limited v. M.J. O'Brien Limited*, [1927] A.C. 369; *Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd* (1982), 2 Q.B.D. 573 and others.

The authorities do not permit any doubt about the principles to be applied in a case such as this. They are set out over and over again in many decided cases and may be summarized as follows:

- (1) There must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements (it was not suggested in this case that the statutory requirements had not been satisfied);
- (2) All material filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done which is not authorized by the C.C.A.A.;
- (3) The plan must be fair and reasonable.

Similarly, there can be no doubt about the purpose of the C.C.A.A. It is to enable compromises to be made for the common benefit of the creditors and of the company, particularly to keep a company in financial difficulties alive and out of the hands of liquidators. To make the Act workable, it is often necessary to permit a requisite majority of each class to bind the minority to the terms of the plan, but the plan must be fair and reasonable.

There were really four issues argued on this appeal but, as is so often the case, there is some overlapping. I shall attempt to deal with them individually.

First it was alleged, principally by Mr. Czepil, that the Act does not authorize a plan whereby the creditors of other companies can vote on the question of whether the creditors of another company may compromise his claim. He called this the cross-company issue.

This argument arises out of the particular facts that Mr. Czepil's client found itself in where it had a first mortgage, that is, Guardian had a first mortgage on a building owned by Unity which was the only asset of Unity, and he says the C.C.A.A. does not permit creditors of other companies to vote on the disposition of Guardian's security. I think there would be considerable merit in this submission except for the fact that the plan contemplates the consolidation of all the petitioner companies and the applications are made in this case, not just under the C.C.A.A., but also under ss. 276-278 of the B.C. Companies Act, R.S.B.C. 1979 c. 59. In this respect, it is necessary to mention s. 20 of the C.C.A.A.

which provides:

20. The provisions of this Act may be applied conjointly with the provisions of any Act of Canada or of any province authorizing or making provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them.

During the argument of these appeals, we were treated to a review of the history of this matter in the court below. In reasons for judgment dated July 5, 1988, Mr. Justice Trainor recited that he had been asked by some of the parties to approve a consolidation plan, but he declined to do so as the plan was not then before him in final form. It is implicit that Trainor, J. thought he had authority to approve a consolidation plan and he referred to American authorities particularly, Baker and Getty Financial Services Inc., U.S. Bankruptcy Court N.D. Ohio (1987) B.R. 139 and in Re Snider Bros., U.S. Bankruptcy Court, D. Mass. (1982) 18 B.R. 320, and he said that he accepted the analysis of Snider, which proposes the test between economic prejudice of continued debtor separateness versus the economic prejudice of consolidation, and holds that consolidation is preferable if its economic prejudice is less than separateness prejudice.

I think Mr. Justice Trainor was right for the reasons described in the American authorities and because to hold otherwise would be to deny much meaning to s. 20 of the C.C.A.A. and would mean that when a group of companies operated conjointly, as these companies did (all were liable on the Bank of Montreal bonds) it would be necessary to propose separate plans for each company and those plans might become fragmented seriously.

I am satisfied there is jurisdiction to entertain a consolidation proposal.

Secondly, it was agreed that the composition of the class of priority creditors was unfair by reason of including all priority mortgagees without regard to the fact that some of them face a deficiency and some did not. The appellants were each in the latter difficulty and they argue that they should have been placed in a different class because the other eleven priority mortgagees were going to get paid in full whether the plan was approved or not. This argument would have more merit if the plan were only for the benefit of the undersecured priority mortgagee. But the plan was also for the benefit of the company and the other creditors who, by their votes, indicated that they thought the plan was in their best interest. The learned chambers judge considered this question carefully. At page 25 of his reasons he said this:

An examination of the relationship between the Companies and the priority mortgagees satisfies me that they are properly in the same class. The points of similarity are:

1. The nature of the debt is the same, that is, money advanced as a loan.
2. It is a corporate loan by a sophisticated lender who is in the business and aware of the gains and risks possible.
3. The nature of the security is that it is a first mortgage.
4. The remedies are the same - foreclosure proceedings, receivership.
5. The result of no reorganization plan would be that the lender would achieve no more than the value of the property, less the costs of carrying until disposal, plus the legal costs as well would come out of that. A possible exception would be if an order absolute left the creditor in the position of holding property for a hoped-for appreciation in value.
6. Treatment of creditors is the same. The term varied to five years, the interest rates twelve percent or less, and the amount varied to what they would get on a

receivership with no loss for costs; that is, it would be somewhat equivalent to the same treatment afforded to the Bank of Montreal under the settlement agreement.

The points of dissimilarity are that they are separate priorities and that there are deficiencies in value of security for the loan, which vary accordingly for particular priority mortgagees. Specifically with respect to Guardian and Excelsior, they are both in a deficiency position.

Now, either of the reasons for points of dissimilarity, if effect was given to them, could result in fragmentation to the extent that a plan would be a realistic impossibility. The distinction which is sought is based on property values, not on contractual rights or legal interests.

I agree with that, but I wish to add that in any complicated plan under this Act, there will often be some secured creditors who appear to be oversecured, some who do not know if they are fully secured or not, and some who appear not to be fully secured. This is a variable cause arising not by any difference in legal interests, but rather as a consequence of bad lending, or market values, or both.

I adopt, with respect, the reasoning of Forsyth, J. of the court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, in a recent unreported decision in *Norcean Energy Resources et al v. Oakwood Petroleum Ltd.*, (17 November 1988) Alberta 880114453-1049 particularly at pp. 13 and 14. I am unable to accede to this ground of appeal.

Thirdly, I pause to mention that it was not suggested that the arrangement with the Bank of Montreal constituted a preference. It was argued, however, that the entire plan was tainted by the agreement made by the companies with Relax. Apparently, there was an appraisal showing a value of its security at \$3.7 million while other evidence suggests a value of between \$4.5 million to \$4.6 million. The amount owing to Relax on its mortgage was \$6 million.

Early in the history of this matter before the plan was finalized, and before the companies struck their crucial arrangement with the Bank of Montreal, the companies and Relax agreed to a future cash payment of \$500,000 and a valuation of \$4 million for the Relax property which could, in total, amount to a preference of up to \$900,000 to Relax and that company, in consideration of that compromise, agreed to vote for the plan.

It should be mentioned that the plan, from its inception, ensured to the priority mortgagees the full market value of their security to be determined either by agreement, appraisal, or, if necessary, arbitration. Thus, the appellants do not stand to lose anything by the agreement made with Relax. It is the bank which carried the burden of that expense.

There is no doubt that side deals are a dangerous game and any arrangement made with just one creditor endangers the appearance of the bona fides of a plan of this kind and any debtor who undertakes such a burden does so at considerable risk. In this case, however, it is apparent that this agreement was not made for the purpose of insuring a favourable vote because at the time the deal was struck the companies had not reached an accommodation arrangement with the Bank. I think the companies were negotiating, as businessmen do, on values for the purpose of putting a plan together.

Further, the arrangement with Relax was fully disclosed in the plan. This does not insure its full absolution if it was improper, but at least it removes any coloration of an underhanded or secret deal. In fact, there were also negotiations between the companies and the appellants but nothing came of those discussions.

After referring to the fact that the plan anticipated and permitted negotiations about values and other matters, the learned chambers judge said this at page 28 and 29 of his reasons:

The negotiations might, on the surface, appear to have been in the nature of an excessive payment to Relax for the consideration in their agreement, which agreement, incidentally, included an undertaking to vote in favour of the Plan. But the answer given by the Companies is that what in effect was happening at that meeting was a negotiation as to the agreed price and that this negotiation took place earlier rather than later and that the parties in fact came to an accord with respect to the agreed price and that the settlement between them was on that basis.

If that is so, it is something which took place in accordance with what is proposed by the Reorganization Plan. I have reviewed and re-read a number of times the submissions by the Companies and particularly by counsel on behalf of Guardian and Excelsior. I am satisfied that I should accept the explanation as to what took place, which has been advanced on behalf of the Companies.

In the circumstances of this case, I would not disagree with the learned chambers judge in that connection.

Lastly, it remains to be considered whether the plan is fair and reasonable. I wish to refer to three matters.

First, the authorities warn us against second-guessing businessmen (see *Re Alabama* supra at p. 244). In this case, the Companies and their advisors, the Bank and its advisors, and all the creditors except the two appellants, voted for the plan. As the authorities say, we should not be astute in finding technical arguments to overcome the decision of such a majority.

Secondly, I wish to mention Mr. Czepil's argument that the plan was unfair, perhaps not conceptually, but operationally by authorizing negotiations. He says this put the parties in a difficult position when it came to vote because they risked retribution if they failed to reach agreement and then voted against the plan. He complains that some benefits offered in negotiations are no longer available to his clients.

With respect, negotiations between businessmen are much to be desired and would not wish to say anything that would impede that salutary process. If negotiations lead to unfairness, then other considerations, of course, arise. But that, in my view, is not this case.

Thirdly, the plan assures all the priority mortgagees the full market value of their security without liquidation expenses. That is more than they could expect to receive if there had been no plan.

What they gave up is the right to take the property by order absolute or to seek a judicial sale and pursue the borrower for the deficiency. Guardian was actually offered its security but declined to accept it. The difficulty about this whole matter is the uncollectability of the deficiency having regard to the overwhelming debt owed to the Bank which would practically eliminate any real chance of recovery of the deficiency.

In my view, the obvious benefits of settling rights and keeping the enterprise together as a going concern far outweigh the deprivation of the appellants' wholly illusory rights. In this connection, the learned chambers judge said at page 29:

I turn to the question of the right to hold the property after an Order Absolute and whether or not this is a denial of something of that significance that it should affect these proceedings. There is in the material before me some evidence of values. There are the principles to which I have referred, as well as to the rights of majorities and the rights of minorities.

Certainly, those Minority rights are there, but it would seem to me that in view of the overall plan, in view of the speculative nature of holding property in the light of appraisals which have been given as to value, that this right is something which should be subsumed to the benefit of the majority.

I agree with that.

I also agree with the learned chambers judge that the plan should have been approved and I would dismiss these appeals accordingly.

MCEACHERN C.J.B.C.

ESSON J.A.:-- I agree.

WALLACE J.A.:-- I agree.

MCEACHERN C.J.B.C.:-- The appeals are dismissed with costs.

TAB 3

Indexed as:

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re)

**Re Olympia & York Developments Ltd. and 23 other
Companies set out in Schedule "A"**

[1993] O.J. No. 545

12 O.R. (3d) 500

17 C.B.R. (3d) 1

38 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1149

Action No. B125/92

Ontario Court (General Division),

R.A. Blair J.

February 5, 1993

1 R.A. BLAIR J. (orally):--On May 14, 1992, Olympia & York Developments Limited and 23 affiliated corporations (the "applicants") sought, and obtained, an order granting them the protection of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, for a period of time while they attempted to negotiate a plan of arrangement with their creditors and to restructure their corporate affairs. The Olympia & York group of companies constitute one of the largest and most respected commercial real estate empires in the world, with prime holdings in the main commercial centres in Canada, the U.S.A., England and Europe. This empire was built by the Reichmann family of Toronto. Unfortunately, it has fallen on hard times, and, indeed, it seems, it has fallen apart.

2 A Final Plan of compromise or arrangements has now been negotiated and voted on by the numerous classes of creditors. Twenty-seven of the 35 classes have voted in favour of the Final Plan; eight have voted against it. The applicants now bring the Final Plan before the court for sanctioning, pursuant to s. 6 of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

THE PLAN

3 The Plan is described in the motion materials as "The Revised Plans of Compromise and Arrangement dated December 16, 1992, as further amended to January 25, 1993". I shall refer to it as the "Plan" or the "Final Plan". Its final purpose, as stated in art. 1.2,

. . . is to effect the reorganization of the businesses and affairs of the Applicants in order to bring stability to the Applicants for a period of not less than five years, in the expectation that all persons with an interest in the Applicants will derive a greater benefit from the continued operation of the businesses and affairs of the Applicants on such a basis than would result from the immediate forced liquidation of the Applicants' assets.

4 The Final Plan envisages the restructuring of certain of the O & Y ownership interests, and a myriad of individual proposals -- with some common themes -- for the treatment of the claims of the various classes of creditors which have been established in the course of the proceedings.

5 The contemplated O & Y restructuring has three principal components, namely:

1. The organization of O & Y Properties, a company to be owned as to 90 per cent by OYDL and as to 10 per cent by the Reichmann family, and which is to become OYDL's Canadian real estate management arm;
2. Subject to certain approvals and conditions, and provided the secured creditors do not exercise their remedies against their security, the transfer by OYDL of its interest in certain Canadian real estate assets to O & Y Properties, in exchange for shares; and,
3. A GW reorganization scheme which will involve the transfer of common shares of GWU holdings to OYDL, the privatization of GW utilities and the amalgamation of GW utilities with OYDL.

6 There are 35 classes of creditors for purposes of voting on the Final Plan and for its implementation. The classes are grouped into four different categories of classes, namely, by claims of project lenders, by claims of joint venture lenders, by claims of joint venture co-participants, and by claims of "other classes".

7 Any attempt by me to summarize, in the confines of reasons such as these, the manner of proposed treatment for these various categories and classes would not do justice to the careful and detailed concept of the Plan. A variety of intricate schemes are put forward, on a class-by-class basis, for dealing with the outstanding debt in question during the five-year Plan period.

8 In general, these schemes call for interest to accrue at the contract or some other negotiated rate, and for interest (and, in some cases, principal) to be paid from time to time during the Plan period if O & Y's cash flow permits. At the same time, O & Y (with, I think, one exception) will continue to manage the properties that it has been managing to date, and will receive revenue in the form of management fees for performing that service. In many, but not all, of the project lender situations, the Final Plan envisages the transfer of title to the newly formed O & Y Properties. Special arrangements have been negotiated with respect to lenders whose claims are against marketable securities, including the Marketable Securities Lenders, the GW Marketable Security and Other Lenders, the Carena Lenders and the Gulf and Abitibi Lenders.

9 It is an important feature of the Final Plan that secured creditors are ceded the right, if they so choose, to exercise their realization remedies at any time (subject to certain strictures regarding timing and notice). In effect, they can "drop out" of the Plan if they desire.

10 The unsecured creditors, of course, are heirs to what may be left. Interest is to accrue on the unsecured loans at the contract rate during the Plan period. The Final Plan calls for the administrator to calculate, at least annually, an amount that may be paid on the O & Y unsecured indebtedness out of OYDL's cash on hand, and such amount, if indeed such an amount is available, may be paid out on court approval of the payment. The unsecured creditors are entitled to object to the transfer of assets to O & Y Properties if they are not reasonably satisfied that O & Y Properties "will be a viable, self-financing entity". At the end of the Plan period, the members of this class are given the option of converting their remaining debt into stock.

11 The Final Plan contemplates the eventuality that one or more of the secured classes may reject it. Section 6.2 provides:

- a) that if the Plan is not approved by the requisite majority of holders of any Class of Secured Claims before January 16, 1993, the stay of proceedings imposed by the initial CCAA order of May 14, 1992, as amended, shall be automatically lifted; and,
- b) that in the event that Creditors (other than the unsecured creditors and one Class of Bondholders' Claims) do not agree to the Plan, any such Class shall be deemed not to have agreed to the Plan and to be a Class of Creditors not affected by the Plan, and that the Applicants shall apply to the court for a Sanction Order which sanctions the Plan only insofar as it affects the Classes which have agreed to the Plan .

12 Finally, I note that art. 1.3 of the Final Plan stipulates that the Plan document "constitutes a separate and severable plan of compromise and arrangement with respect to each of the Applicants".

THE PRINCIPLES TO BE APPLIED ON SANCTIONING

13 In *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 sub nom. *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (C.A.)*, Doherty J.A. concluded his examination of the purpose and scheme of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, with this overview, at pp. 308-09 O.R., pp. 122-23 C.B.R.:

Viewed in its totality, the Act gives the court control over the initial decision to put the reorganization plan before the creditors, the classification of creditors for the purpose of considering the plan, conduct affecting the debtor company pending consideration of that plan, and the ultimate acceptability of any plan agreed upon by the creditors. The Act envisions that the rights and remedies of individual creditors, the debtor company, and others may be sacrificed, at least temporarily, in an effort to serve the greater good by arriving at some acceptable reorganization which allows the debtor company to continue in operation: *Icor Oil & Gas Co. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (No. 1)* (1989), 102 A.R. 161 (Q.B.), at p. 165.

14 Mr. Justice Doherty's summary, I think, provides a very useful focus for approaching the task of sanctioning a plan.

15 Section 6 of the CCAA reads as follows:

6. Where a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding

- (a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and
- (b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the Bankruptcy Act or is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up Act, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

(Emphasis added)

16 Thus, the final step in the CCAA process is court sanctioning of the Plan, after which the Plan becomes binding on the creditors and the company. The exercise of this statutory obligation imposed upon the court is a matter of discretion.

17 The general principles to be applied in the exercise of the court's discretion have been developed in a number of authorities. They were summarized by Mr. Justice Trainor in *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C.S.C.), and adopted on appeal in that case by McEachern C.J.B.C., who set them out in the following fashion at (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C.C.A.), p. 201:

The authorities do not permit any doubt about the principles to be applied in a case such as this. They are set out over and over again in many decided cases and may be summarized as follows:

- (1) There must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements . . .
- (2) All materials filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done [or purported to have been done] which is not authorized by the C.C.A.A.;
- (3) The plan must be fair and reasonable.

18 In an earlier Ontario decision, *Re Dairy Corp. of Canada*, [1934] O.R. 436, [1934] 3 D.L.R. 347 (C.A.), Middleton J.A. applied identical criteria to a situation involving an arrangement under

the Ontario Companies Act, R.S.O. 1927, c. 218. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal recently followed *Re Northland Properties Ltd. in Re Keddy Motor Inns Ltd.* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245, 6 B.L.R. (2d) 116 (N.S.C.A.). Farley J. did as well in *Re Campeau* (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 104 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

Strict compliance with statutory requirements

19 Both this first criterion, dealing with statutory requirements, and the second criterion, dealing with the absence of any unauthorized conduct, I take to refer to compliance with the various procedural imperatives of the legislation itself, or to compliance with the various orders made by the court during the course of the CCAA process: see *Re Campeau*.

20 At the outset, on May 14, 1992, I found that the applicants met the criteria for access to the protection of the Act -- they are insolvent; they have outstanding issues of bonds issued in favour of a trustee, and the compromise proposed at that time, and now, includes a compromise of the claims of those creditors whose claims are pursuant to the trust deeds. During the course of the proceedings creditors' committees have been formed to facilitate the negotiation process, and creditors have been divided into classes for the purposes of voting, as envisaged by the Act. Votes of those classes of creditors have been held, as required.

21 With the consent, and at the request of, the applicants and the creditors' committees, the Honourable David H.W. Henry, a former justice of this court, was appointed "claims officer" by order dated September 11, 1992. His responsibilities in that capacity included, as well as the determination of the value of creditors' claims for voting purposes, the responsibility of presiding over the meetings at which the votes were taken, or of designating someone else to do so. The Honourable Mr. Henry, himself, or the Honourable M. Craig or the Honourable W. Gibson Gray -- both also former justices of this court -- as his designees, presided over the meetings of the classes of creditors, which took place during the period from January 11, 1993 to January 25, 1993. I have his report as to the results of each of the meetings of creditors, and confirming that the meetings were duly convened and held pursuant to the provisions of the court orders pertaining to them and the CCAA.

22 I am quite satisfied that there has been strict compliance with the statutory requirements of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

Unauthorized conduct

23 I am also satisfied that nothing has been done or purported to have been done which is not authorized by the CCAA.

24 Since May 14, the court has been called upon to make approximately 60 orders of different sorts, in the course of exercising its supervisory function in the proceedings. These orders involved the resolution of various issues between the creditors by the court in its capacity as "referee" of the negotiation process; they involved the approval of the "GAR" orders negotiated between the parties with respect to the funding of O & Y's general and administrative expenses and restructuring costs throughout the "stay" period; they involved the confirmation of the sale of certain of the applicants' assets, both upon the agreement of various creditors and for the purposes of funding the "GAR" requirements; they involved the approval of the structuring of creditors' committees, the classification of creditors for purposes of voting, the creation and defining of the role of "information officer" and, similarly, of the role of "claims officer". They involved the endorsement of the information

circular respecting the Final Plan and the mail and notice that was to be given regarding it. The court's orders encompassed, as I say, the general supervision of the negotiation and arrangement period, and the interim sanctioning of procedures implemented and steps taken by the applicants and the creditors along the way.

25 While the court, of course, has not been a participant during the elaborate negotiations and undoubted boardroom brawling which preceded and led up to the Final Plan of compromise, I have, with one exception, been the judge who has made the orders referred to. No one has drawn to my attention any instances of something being done during the proceedings which is not authorized by the CCAA.

26 In these circumstances, I am satisfied that nothing unauthorized under the CCAA has been done during the course of the proceedings.

27 This brings me to the criterion that the Plan must be "fair and reasonable".

Fair and reasonable

28 The Plan must be "fair and reasonable". That the ultimate expression of the court's responsibility in sanctioning a plan should find itself telescoped into those two words is not surprising. "Fairness" and "reasonableness" are, in my opinion, the two keynote concepts underscoring the philosophy and workings of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. "Fairness" is the quintessential expression of the court's equitable jurisdiction -- although the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad discretionary powers given to the judiciary by the legislation make its exercise an exercise in equity -- and "reasonableness" is what lends objectivity to the process.

29 From time to time, in the course of these proceedings, I have borrowed liberally from the comments of Mr. Justice Gibbs, whose decision in *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.), contains much helpful guidance in matters of the CCAA. The thought I have borrowed most frequently is his remark, at p. 314 C.B.R., p. 116 B.C.L.R., that the court is "called upon to weigh the equities, or balance the relative degrees of prejudice, which would flow from granting or refusing" the relief sought under the Act. This notion is particularly apt, it seems to me, when consideration is being given to the sanctioning of the Plan.

30 If a debtor company, in financial difficulties, has a reasonable chance of staving off a liquidator by negotiating a compromise arrangement with its creditors, "fairness" to its creditors as a whole, and to its shareholders, prescribes that it should be allowed an opportunity to do so, consistent with not "unfairly" or "unreasonably" depriving secured creditors of their rights under their security. Negotiations should take place in an environment structured and supervised by the court in a "fair" and balanced -- or "reasonable" -- manner. When the negotiations have been completed and a plan of arrangement arrived at, and when the creditors have voted on it -- technical and procedural compliance with the Act aside -- the plan should be sanctioned if it is "fair and reasonable".

31 When a plan is sanctioned it becomes binding upon the debtor company and upon creditors of that company. What is "fair and reasonable", then, must be assessed in the context of the impact of the plan on the creditors and the various classes of creditors, in the context of their response to the plan, and with a view to the purpose of the CCAA.

32 On the appeal in *Re Northland Properties Ltd.*, supra, at p. 201, Chief Justice McEachern made the following comment in this regard:

. . . there can be no doubt about the purpose of the C.C.A.A. It is to enable compromises to be made for the common benefit of the creditors and of the company, particularly to keep a company in financial difficulties alive and out of the hands of liquidators. To make the Act workable, it is often necessary to permit a requisite majority of each class to bind the minority to the terms of the plan, but the plan must be fair and reasonable.

33 In *Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas & Pacific Junction Railway Co.*, [1891] 1 Ch. 213 (C.A.), a case involving a scheme and arrangement under the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870 (U.K.), c. 104, Lord Justice Bowen put it this way, at p. 243:

Now, I have no doubt at all that it would be improper for the Court to allow an arrangement to be forced on any class of creditors, if the arrangement cannot reasonably be supposed by sensible business people to be for the benefit of that class as such, otherwise the sanction of the Court would be a sanction to what would be a scheme of confiscation. The object of this section is not confiscation. . . Its object is to enable compromises to be made which are for the common benefit of the creditors as creditors, or for the common benefit of some class of creditors as such.

Again at p. 245:

It is in my judgment desirable to call attention to this section, and to the extreme care which ought to be brought to bear upon the holding of meetings under it. It enables a compromise to be forced upon the outside creditors by a majority of the body, or upon a class of the outside creditors by a majority of that class.

34 Is the Final Plan presented here by the O & Y applicants "fair and reasonable"?

35 I have reviewed the Plan, including the provisions relating to each of the classes of creditors. I believe I have an understanding of its nature and purport, of what it is endeavouring to accomplish, and of how it proposes this be done. To describe the Plan as detailed, technical, enormously complex and all-encompassing, would be to understate the proposition. This is, after all, we are told, the largest corporate restructuring in Canadian -- if not worldwide -- corporate history. It would be folly for me to suggest that I comprehend the intricacies of the Plan in all of its minutiae and in all of its business, tax and corporate implications. Fortunately, it is unnecessary for me to have that depth of understanding. I must only be satisfied that the Plan is fair and reasonable in the sense that it is feasible and that it fairly balances the interests of all of the creditors, the company and its shareholders.

36 One important measure of whether a plan is fair and reasonable is the parties' approval of the Plan, and the degree to which approval has been given.

37 As other courts have done, I observe that it is not my function to second guess the business people with respect to the "business" aspects of the Plan, descending into the negotiating arena and substituting my own view of what is a fair and reasonable compromise or arrangement for that of the business judgment of the participants. The parties themselves know best what is in their interests in those areas.

38 This point has been made in numerous authorities, of which I note the following: *Re Northland Properties Ltd.*, supra, at p. 205; *Re Langley's Ltd.*, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.), at p. 129 O.R., pp. 233-34 D.L.R.; *Re Keddy Motor Inns Ltd*, supra; *École internationale de haute esth etique Edith Serei Inc. (Receiver of) v. Edith Serei internationale (1987) Inc. (1989)*, 78 C.B.R. (N.S.) 36 (Que. S.C.).

39 In *Re Keddy Motor Inns Ltd.*, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal spoke of "a very heavy burden" on parties seeking to show that a plan is not fair and reasonable, involving "matters of substance", when the plan has been approved by the requisite majority of creditors: see pp. 257-58 C.B.R., pp. 128-29 B.L.R. Freeman J.A. stated at p. 258 C.B.R., p. 129 B.L.R.:

The Act clearly contemplates rough-and-tumble negotiations between debtor companies desperately seeking a chance to survive and creditors willing to keep them afloat, but on the best terms they can get. What the creditors and the company must live with is a plan of their own design, not the creation of a court. The court's role is to ensure that creditors who are bound unwillingly under the Act are not made victims of the majority and forced to accept terms that are unconscionable.

40 In *Re École internationale*, at p. 38, Dugas J. spoke of the need for "serious grounds" to be advanced in order to justify the court in refusing to approve a proposal, where creditors have accepted it, unless the proposal is unethical.

41 In this case, as Mr. Kennedy points out in his affidavit filed in support of the sanction motion, the Final Plan is "the culmination of several months of intense negotiations and discussions between the applicants and their creditors, [reflects] significant input of virtually all of the classes of creditors and [is] the product of wide-ranging consultations, give and take a compromise on the part of the participants in the negotiating and bargaining process". The body of creditors, moreover, Mr. Kennedy notes, "consists almost entirely of sophisticated financial institutions represented by experienced legal counsel" who are, in many cases, "members of creditors' committees constituted pursuant to the amended order of May 14, 1992". Each creditors' committee had the benefit of independent and experienced legal counsel.

42 With the exception of the eight classes of creditors that did not vote to accept the Plan, the Plan met with the overwhelming approval of the secured creditors and the unsecured creditors of the applicants. This level of approval is something the court must acknowledge with some deference.

43 Those secured creditors who have approved the Plan retain their rights to realize upon their security at virtually any time, subject to certain requirements regarding notice. In the meantime, they are to receive interest on their outstanding indebtedness, either at the original contract rate or at some other negotiated rate, and the payment of principal is postponed for a period of five years.

44 The claims of creditors -- in this case, secured creditors -- who did not approve the Plan are specifically treated under the Plan as "unaffected claims", i.e., claims not compromised or bound by the provisions of the Plan. Section 6.2(c) of the Final Plan states that the applicants may apply to the court for a sanction order which sanctions the Plan only insofar as it affects the classes which have agreed to the Plan.

45 The claims of unsecured creditors under the Plan are postponed for five years, with interest to accrue at the relevant contract rate. There is a provision for the administrator to calculate, at least

annually, an amount out of OYDL's cash on hand which may be made available for payment to the unsecured creditors, if such an amount exists, and if the court approves its payment to the unsecured creditors. The unsecured creditors are given some control over the transfer of real estate to O & Y Properties, and, at the end of the Plan period, are given the right, if they wish, to convert their debt to stock.

46 Faced with the prospects of recovering nothing on their claims in the event of a liquidation, against the potential of recovering something if O & Y is able to turn things around, the unsecured creditors at least have the hope of gaining something if the applicants are able to become the "self-sustaining and viable corporation" which Mr. Kennedy predicts they will become "in accordance with the terms of the Plan".

47 Speaking as co-chair of the unsecured creditors' committee at the meeting of that class of creditors, Mr. Ed Lundy made the following remarks:

Firstly, let us apologize for the lengthy delays in today's proceedings. It was truly felt necessary for the creditors of this Committee to have a full understanding of the changes and implications made because there were a number of changes over this past weekend, plus today, and we wanted to be in a position to give a general overview observation to the Plan.

The Committee has retained accounting and legal professionals in Canada and the United States. The Co-Chairs, as well as institutions serving on the Plan and U.S. Subcommittees with the assistance of the Committee's professionals have worked for the past seven to eight months evaluating the financial, economic and legal issues affecting the Plan for the unsecured creditors.

In addition, the Committee and its Subcommittees have met frequently during the CCAA proceedings to discuss these issues. Unfortunately, the assets of OYDL are such that their ultimate values cannot be predicted in the short term. As a result, the recovery, if any, by the unsecured creditors cannot now be predicted.

The alternative to approval of the CCAA Plan of arrangement appears to be a bankruptcy. The CCAA Plan of arrangement has certain advantages and disadvantages over bankruptcy. These matters have been carefully considered by the Committee.

After such consideration, the members have indicated their intentions as follows . . .

Twelve members of the Committee have today indicated they will vote in favour of the Plan. No members have indicated they will vote against the Plan. One

member declined to indicate to the committee members how they wished to vote today. One member of the Plan was absent. Thank you.

48 After further discussion at the meeting of the unsecured creditors, the vote was taken. The Final Plan was approved by 83 creditors, representing 93.26 per cent of the creditors represented and voting at the meeting and 93.37 per cent in value of the claims represented and voting at the meeting.

49 As for the O & Y applicants, the impact of the Plan is to place OYDL in the position of property manager of the various projects, in effect for the creditors, during the Plan period. OYDL will receive income in the form of management fees for these services, a fact which gives some economic feasibility to the expectation that the company will be able to service its debt under the Plan. Should the economy improve and the creditors not realize upon their security, it may be that at the end of the period there will be some equity in the properties for the newly incorporated O & Y Properties and an opportunity for the shareholders to salvage something from the wrenching dis-embodiment of their once shining real estate empire.

50 In keeping with an exercise of weighing the equities and balancing the prejudices, another measure of what is "fair and reasonable" is the extent to which the proposed Plan treats creditors equally in their opportunities to recover, consistent with their security rights, and whether it does so in as non-intrusive and as non-prejudicial a manner as possible.

51 I am satisfied that the Final Plan treats creditors evenly and fairly. With the "drop out" clause entitling secured creditors to realize upon their security, should they deem it advisable at any time, all parties seem to be entitled to receive at least what they would receive out of a liquidation, i.e., as much as they would have received had there not been a reorganization: see *Re NsC Diesel Power Inc.* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 97 N.S.R. (2d) 295 (T.D.). Potentially, they may receive more.

52 The Plan itself envisages other steps and certain additional proceedings that will be taken. Not the least inconsiderable of these, for example, is the proposed GW reorganization and contemplated arrangement under the Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16. These further steps and proceedings, which lie in the future, may well themselves raise significant issues that have to be resolved between the parties or, failing their ability to resolve them, by the court. I do not see this prospect as something which takes away from the fairness or reasonableness of the Plan but rather as part of grist for the implementation mill.

53 For all of the foregoing reasons, I find the Final Plan put forward to be "fair and reasonable".

54 Before sanction can be given to the Plan, however, there is one more hurdle which must be overcome. It has to do with the legal question of whether there must be unanimity amongst the classes of creditors in approving the Plan before the court is empowered to give its sanction to the Plan.

Lack of unanimity amongst the classes of creditors

55 As indicated at the outset, all of the classes of creditors did not vote in favour of the Final Plan. Of the 35 classes that voted, 27 voted in favour (overwhelmingly, it might be added, both in terms of numbers and percentage of value in each class). In eight of the classes, however, the vote was either against acceptance of the Plan or the Plan did not command sufficient support in terms of numbers of creditors and/or percentage of value of claims to meet the 50/75 per cent test of s. 6.

56 The classes of creditors who voted against acceptance of the Plan are in each case comprised of secured creditors who hold their security against a single project asset or, in the case of the Carena claims, against a single group of shares. Those who voted "no" are the following:

Class 2 -- First Canadian Place Lenders Class 8 -- Fifth Avenue Place Bondholders
Class 10 -- Amoco Centre Lenders Class 13 -- L'Esplanade Laurier Bondholders
Class 20 -- Star Top Road Lenders Class 21 -- Yonge-Sheppard Centre Lenders
Class 29 -- Carena Lenders
Class 33a -- Bank of Nova Scotia Other Secured creditors

57 While s. 6 of the CCAA makes the mathematics of the approval process clear -- the Plan must be approved by at least 50 per cent of the creditors of a particular class representing at least 75 per cent of the dollar value of the claims in that class -- it is not entirely clear as to whether the Plan must be approved by every class of creditors before it can be sanctioned by the court. The language of the section, it will be recalled, is as follows:

6. Where a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors . . . agree to any compromise or arrangement . . . the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court.

(Emphasis added)

58 What does "a majority . . . of the . . . class of creditors" mean? Presumably it must refer to more than one group or class of creditors, otherwise there would be no need to differentiate between "creditors" and "class of creditors". But is the majority of the "class of creditors" confined to a majority within an individual class, or does it refer more broadly to a majority within each and every "class", as the sense and purpose of the Act might suggest?

59 This issue of "unanimity" of class approval has caused me some concern, because, of course, the Final Plan before me has not received that sort of blessing. Its sanctioning, however, is being sought by the applicants, is supported by all of the classes of creditors approving, and is not opposed by any of the classes of creditors which did not approve.

60 At least one authority has stated that strict compliance with the provisions of the CCAA respecting the vote is a prerequisite to the court having jurisdiction to sanction a plan: See *Re Keddy Motor Inns Ltd.*, supra. Accepting that such is the case, I must therefore be satisfied that unanimity amongst the classes is not a requirement of the Act before the court's sanction can be given to the Final Plan.

61 In assessing this question, it is helpful to remember, I think, that the CCAA is remedial and that it "must be given a wide and liberal construction so as to enable it to effectively serve this . . . purpose": *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*, supra, per Doherty J.A., at p. 307 O.R., p. 120 C.B.R. Speaking for the majority in that case as well, Finlayson J.A. (Krever J.A., concurring) put it this way, at p. 297 O.R., pp. 110-11 C.B.R.:

It is well established that the CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Such a resolution can have significant benefits

for the company, its shareholders and employees. For this reason the debtor companies . . . are entitled to a broad and liberal interpretation of the jurisdiction of the court under the CCAA.

62 Approaching the interpretation of the unclear language of s. 6 of the Act from this perspective, then, one must have regard to the purpose and object of the legislation and to the wording of the section within the rubric of the Act as a whole. Section 6 is not to be construed in isolation.

63 Two earlier provisions of the CCAA set the context in which the creditors' meetings which are the subject of s. 6 occur. Sections 4 and 5 state that where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors (s. 4) or its secured creditors (s. 5), the court may order a meeting of the creditors to be held. The format of each section is the same. I reproduce the pertinent portions of s. 5 here only, for the sake of brevity. It states:

5. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor . . . order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors.

(Emphasis added)

64 It seems that the compromise or arrangement contemplated is one with the secured creditors (as a whole) or any class -- as opposed to all classes -- of them. A logical extension of this analysis is that, other circumstances being appropriate, the plan which the court is asked to approve may be one involving some, but not all, of the classes of creditors.

65 Surprisingly, there seems to be a paucity of authority on the question of whether a plan must be approved by the requisite majorities in all classes before the court can grant its sanction. Only two cases of which I am aware touch on the issue at all, and neither of these is directly on point.

66 In *Re Wellington Building Corp.*, [1934] O.R. 653 (S.C.), Mr. Justice Kingstone dealt with a situation in which the creditors had been divided, for voting purposes, into secured and unsecured creditors, but there had been no further division amongst the secured creditors who were comprised of first mortgage bondholders, second, third and fourth mortgagees, and lienholders. Kingstone J. refused to sanction the plan because it would have been "unfair" to the bondholders to have done so (p. 661). At p. 660, he stated:

I think, while one meeting may have been sufficient under the Act for the purpose of having all the classes of secured creditors summoned, it was necessary under the Act that they should vote in classes and that three-fourths of the value of each class should be obtained in support of the scheme before the Court could or should approve of it.

(Emphasis added)

67 This statement suggests that unanimity amongst the classes of creditors in approving the plan is a requirement under the CCAA. Kingstone J. went on to explain his reasons as follows (p. 660):

Particularly is this the case where the holders of the senior securities' (in this case the bondholders') rights are seriously affected by the proposal, as they are deprived of the arrears of interest on their bonds if the proposal is carried through. It was never the intention under the Act, I am convinced, to deprive creditors in the position of these bondholders of their right to approve as a class by the necessary majority of a scheme propounded by the company; otherwise this would permit the holders of junior securities to put through a scheme inimical to this class and amounting to confiscation of the vested interest of the bondholders.

68 Thus, the plan in *Re Wellington Building Corp.* went unsanctioned, both because the bondholders had unfairly been deprived of their right to vote on the plan as a class and because they would have been unfairly deprived of their rights by the imposition of what amounted to a confiscation of their vested interests as bondholders.

69 On the other hand, the Quebec Superior Court sanctioned a plan where there was a lack of unanimity in *Multidev Immobilia Inc. v. S.A. Just Invest* (1988), 70 C.B.R. (N.S.) 91, [1988] R.J.Q. 1928 (S.C.). There, the arrangement had been accepted by all creditors except one secured creditor, S.A. Just Invest. The company presented an amended arrangement which called for payment of the objecting creditor in full. The other creditors were aware that Just Invest was to receive this treatment. Just Invest, nonetheless, continued to object. Thus, three of eight classes of creditors were in favour of the plan; one, Bank of Montreal, was unconcerned because it had struck a separate agreement; and three classes of which Just Invest was a member, opposed.

70 The Quebec Superior Court felt that it would be contrary to the objectives of the CCAA to permit a secured creditor who was to be paid in full to upset an arrangement which had been accepted by other creditors. Parent J. was of the view that the Act would not permit the court to ratify an arrangement which had been refused by a class or classes of creditors (Just Invest), thereby binding the objecting creditor to something that it had not accepted. He concluded, however, that the arrangement could be approved as regards the other creditors who voted in favour of the Plan. The other creditors were cognizant of the arrangement whereby Just Invest was to be fully reimbursed for its claims, as I have indicated, and there was no objection to that amongst the classes that voted in favour of the Plan.

71 While it might be said that *Multidev*, supra, supports the proposition that a Plan will not be ratified if a class of creditors opposes, the decision is also consistent with the carving out of that portion of the Plan which concerns the objecting creditor and the sanctioning of the balance of the Plan, where there was no prejudice to the objecting creditor in doing so. To my mind, such an approach is analogous to that found in the Final Plan of the O & Y applicants which I am being asked to sanction.

72 I think it relatively clear that a court would not sanction a plan if the effect of doing so were to impose it upon a class, or classes, of creditors who rejected it and to bind them by it. Such a sanction would be tantamount to the kind of unfair confiscation which the authorities unanimously indicate is not the purpose of the legislation. That, however, is not what is proposed here.

73 By the terms of the Final Plan itself, the claims of creditors who reject the Plan are to be treated as "unaffected claims" not bound by its provisions. In addition, secured creditors are entitled to exercise their realization rights either immediately upon the "consummation date" (March 15, 1993) or thereafter, on notice. In short, even if they approve the Plan, secured creditors have the

right to drop out at any time. Everyone participating in the negotiation of the Plan and voting on it, knew of this feature. There is little difference, and little different effect on those approving the Plan, it seems to me, if certain of the secured creditors drop out in advance by simply refusing to approve the Plan in the first place. Moreover, there is no prejudice to the eight classes of creditors which have not approved the Plan, because nothing is being imposed upon them which they have not accepted and none of their rights is being "confiscated".

74 From this perspective it could be said that the parties are merely being held to -- or allowed to follow -- their contractual arrangement. There is, indeed, authority to suggest that a plan of compromise or arrangement is simply a contract between the debtor and its creditors, sanctioned by the court, and that the parties should be entitled to put anything into such a plan that could be lawfully incorporated into any contract: see *Re Canadian Vinyl Industries Inc.* (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 12 (Que. S.C.), at p. 18; Houlden & Morawetz, *Bankruptcy Law of Canada*, vol. 1 (Toronto: Carswell, 1984), pp. E-6 and E-7.

75 In the end, the question of determining whether a plan may be sanctioned when there has not been unanimity of approval amongst the classes of creditors becomes one of asking whether there is any unfairness to the creditors who have not approved it, in doing so. Where, as here, the creditors classes which have not voted to accept the Final Plan will not be bound by the Plan as sanctioned, and are free to exercise their full rights as secured creditors against the security they hold, there is nothing unfair in sanctioning the Final Plan without unanimity, in my view.

76 I am prepared to do so.

77 A draft order, revised as of late this morning, has been presented for approval. It is correct to assume, I have no hesitation in thinking, that each and every paragraph and subparagraph, and each and every word, comma, semicolon, and capital letter has been vigilantly examined by the creditors and a battalion of advisers. I have been told by virtually every counsel who rose to make submissions, that the draft as it exists represents a very "fragile consensus", and I have no doubt that such is the case. Its wording, however, has not received the blessing of three of the classes of project lenders who voted against the Final Plan -- the First Canadian Place, Fifth Avenue Place and L'Esplanade Laurier Bondholders.

78 Their counsel, Mr. Barrack, has put forward their serious concerns in the strong and skilful manner to which we have become accustomed in these proceedings. His submission, put too briefly to give it the justice it deserves, is that the Plan does not and cannot bind those classes of creditors who have voted "no", and that the language of the sanctioning order should state this clearly and in a positive way. Paragraph 9 of his factum states the argument succinctly. It says:

9. It is submitted that if the Court chooses to sanction the Plan currently before it, it is incumbent on the Court to make clear in its Order that the Plan and the other provisions of the proposed Sanction Order apply to and are binding upon only the company, its creditors in respect of claims in classes which have approved the Plan, and trustees for such creditors.

79 The basis for the concern of these "no" creditors is set out in the next paragraph of the factum, which states:

10. This clarification in the proposed Sanction Order is required not only to ensure that the Order is only binding on the parties to the compromises but also to clarify that if a creditor has multiple claims against the company and only some fall within approved classes, then the Sanction Order only affects those claims and is not binding upon and has no effect upon the balance of that creditor's claims or rights.

80 The provision in the proposed draft order which is the most contentious is para. 4 thereof, which states:

4. THIS COURT ORDERS that subject to paragraph 5 hereof the Plan be and is hereby sanctioned and approved and will be binding on and will enure to the benefit of the Applicants and the Creditors holding Claims in Classes referred to in paragraph 2 of this Order in their capacities as such Creditors.

81 Mr. Barrack seeks to have a single, but much debated word -- "only" -- inserted in the second line of that paragraph after the word "will", so that it would read "and will only be binding on . . . the Applicants and the Creditors holding Claims in Classes [which have approved the Plan]". On this simple, single word, apparently, the razor-thin nature of the fragile consensus amongst the remaining creditors will shatter.

82 In the alternative, Mr. Barrack asks that para. 4 of the draft be amended and an additional paragraph added as follows:

35. It is submitted that to reflect properly the Court's jurisdiction, paragraph 4 of the proposed Sanction Order should be amended to state:

4. This Court Orders that the Plan be and is hereby sanctioned and approved and is binding only upon the Applicants listed in Schedule A to this Order, creditors in respect of the claims in those classes listed in paragraph 2 hereof, and any trustee for any such class of creditors.

36. It is also submitted that any additional paragraph should be added if any provisions of the proposed Sanction Order are granted beyond paragraph 4 thereof as follows:

This Court Orders that, except for claims falling within classes listed in paragraph 2 hereof, no claims or rights of any sort of any person shall be adversely affected in any way by the provisions of the Plan, this Order or any other Order previously made in these proceedings.

83 These suggestions are vigorously opposed by the applicants and most of the other creditors. Acknowledging that the Final Plan does not bind those creditors who did not accept it, they submit that no change in the wording of the proposed order is necessary in order to provide those creditors with the protection to which they say they are entitled. In any event, they argue, such disputes, should they arise, relate to the interpretation of the Plan, not to its sanctioning, and should only be dealt with in the context in which they subsequently arise if arise they do.

84 The difficulty is that there may or may not be a difference between the order "binding" creditors and "affecting" creditors. The Final Plan is one that has specific features for specific classes of creditors, and as well some common or generic features which cut across classes. This is the inevitable result of a Plan which is negotiated in the crucible of such an immense corporate restructuring. It may be, or it may not be, that the objecting project lenders who voted "no" find themselves "affected" or touched in some fashion, at some future time by some aspect of the Plan. With a reorganization and corporate restructuring of this dimension it may simply not be realistic to expect that the world of the secured creditor, which became not-so-perfect with the onslaught of the applicants' financial difficulties, and even less so with the commencement of the CCAA proceedings, will ever be perfect again.

85 I do, however, agree with the thrust of Mr. Barrack's submissions that the sanction order and the Plan can be binding only upon the applicants and the creditors of the applicants in respect of claims in classes which have approved the Plan, and trustees for such creditors. That is, in effect, what the Final Plan itself provides for when, in s. 6.2 (c), it stipulates that, where classes of creditors do not agree to the Plan,

- (i) the applicants shall treat such class of claims to be an unaffected class of claims; and,
- (ii) the applicants shall apply to the court "for a Sanction Order which sanctions the Plan only insofar as it affects the Classes which have agreed to the Plan".

86 The Final Plan before me is therefore sanctioned on that basis. I do not propose to make any additional changes to the draft order as presently presented. In the end, I accept the position, so aptly put by Ms. Caron, that the price of an overabundance of caution in changing the wording may be to destroy the intricate balance amongst the creditors which is presently in place.

87 In terms of the court's jurisdiction, s. 6 directs me to sanction the order, if the circumstances are appropriate, and enacts that, once I have done so, the order "is binding . . . on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors . . . and on the company". As I see it, that is exactly what the draft order presented to me does.

88 Accordingly, an order will go in terms of the draft order marked "revised Feb. 5, 1993", with the agreed amendments noted thereon, and on which I have placed my fiat.

89 These reasons were delivered orally at the conclusion of the sanctioning hearing which took place on February 1 and February 5, 1993. They are released in written form today.

Counsel:

COUNSEL FOR SANCTIONING HEARING ORDER SCHEDULE "A"

[para90] David A. Brown, Q.C., Yoine Goldstein, Q.C., Stephen Sharpe and Mark E. Meland, for Olympia & York.

[para91] Ronald N. Robertson, Q.C., for Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp.

[para92] David E. Baird, Q.C., and Patricia Jackson, for Bank of Nova Scotia.

[para93] Michael Barrack and S. Richard Orzy, for First Canadian Place Bondholders, Fifth Avenue Place Bondholders and L'Esplanade Laurier Bondholders.

[para94] William G. Horton, for Royal Bank of Canada.

[para95] Peter Howard and J. Superina, for Citibank Canada.

[para96] Frank J.C. Nebould, Q.C., for Unsecured/Under Secured Creditors Committee.

[para97] John W. Brown, Q.C., and J.J. Lucki, for Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

[para98] Harry Fogul and Harold S. Springer, for The Exchange Tower Bondholders

[para99] Allan Sternberg and Lawrence Geringer, for O & Y Eurocreditco Debenture Holders.

[para100] Arthur O. Jacques and Paul M. Kennedy, for Bank of Nova Scotia, Agent for Scotia Plaza Lenders.

[para101] Lyndon Barnes and J.E. Fordyce, for Crédit Lyonnais, Cr edit Lyonnais Canada.

J. Carfagnini, for National Bank of Canada.

J.L. McDougall, Q.C., for Bank of Montreal.

[para102] Carol V. E. Hitchman, for Bank of Montreal (Phase I First Canadian Place).

[para103] James A. Grout, for Credit Suisse.

[para104] Robert I. Thornton, for I.B.J. Market Security Lenders.

C. Carron, for European Investment Bank.

[para105] W.J. Burden, for some debtholders of O & Y Commercial Paper II Inc.

G.D. Capern, for Robert Campeau.

[para106] Robert S. Harrison and A.T. Little, for Royal Trust Co. as trustee.

Order accordingly.